[iwar] [fc:WHAT.If.It.Happened.in.America??]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-16 06:43:58


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:WHAT.If.It.Happened.in.America??]
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WHAT If It Happened in America??

Chicago, IL., September 5, 1995 -- Three series of events, that have
occurred in 1995, that should cause Americans to stop, pause, and consider
both their luck and preparedness. The series of tragic events involve
multiple terrorist attacks in Tokyo/Yokahoma,Japan, Tel Aviv/Jerusalem,
Israel, and now in Paris, France. The psychological and emotional impact of
these events is just beginning to be understood.

In both France and Japan the public response, in some quarters, to the
continued attacks, has reportedly bordered on hysteria. The Israeli
response, steeled by years of conflict and continued battles with its
Palestinian neighbors, seems to have made its residents more stoic in the
face of continued assault. In both France and Japan, government officials
have blamed the media for much of the fear and concern among citizens and
have called for restraint of the coverage of such events. The Israeli press
covers an on-going conflict on a much more frequent basis and appears to
have a much more "matter of fact" approach to the atrocities. The rhetorical
question is obvious..to what can we attribute the differences in the public
attitudes in France, Japan, and Israel? Further, what kind of public
response could be expected in America, should she be subjected to a series
of devastating bomb threats, bombings, or public gas poisonings?

On of the frequently overlooked aspects of counter-terrorist (CT) operations
would appear to be a developmental understanding of the public's perspective
towards the act(s). A prevailing attitude among at least some CT experts
seem to be that the best answer to this issue involves finding some way to
invoke complete public ignorance of the circumstances or implications of the
act. Another involves the the 'sand-bagging" of the press with "no comment"
comments and the citing "security concerns" as a reason not to explain the
situation to the public. Yet another view actually purports the use of
misinformation or misdirection in hopes of affording some sort of
"operational security".

In order to understand the public response to a terrorist act, it is also
necessary to ask what effect the acts of those managing the event will have
on the public psyche. If anything can be learned from the management of
other disasters or major traumatic events, it is that ignorance of the
situation frequently leads to panic, misunderstanding, and criticism and
alienation between rescuers and the public. A far better approach has been
developed by many civilian emergency management systems. It begins, in at
least some ways, to answer the public's questions and attempts to explain
the inexplicable...a major act of terror.

To gain a better understanding of this process, several points should be
considered:

* An overriding goal is to cause fear in the populace.
* One of the terrorist main goals is to foster and spread mistrust between a
government and its citizens.
* A third goal is change public perceptions and attitudes toward the
government, its policies, or its anticipated actions
* On given occasions, unexplained benevolent acts, such as releasing
hostages or providing medical care to enemies, are done to gain publicity
and/or favorable public attention
* It is likely that in several recent terrorist acts that no claim of
responsibility is being made, out of fear of public criticism or
discontinued support for the sponsoring organization(s) (aside from
attempting to escape apprehension or retribution)
* Misinformation and falsifications are often, if not always, exposed at
some future date and frequently reflect dishonesty/discredit on those
perpetrating the fraud, regardless of the alleged motivation.
* "The Press", if not made an ally in during the incident, may well become
an adversary during it and after it is over. If they are not given some
facts as the story develops, they will undoubtedly "make them up" in order
to meet the public need for explanation.

It should be noted that none of these comments are intended or should be
contrued as attempting, in any way, to compromise real operational security
issues. It is well understood by this author that the withholding of
essential information, equipment, methods, tactics, and strategies is often
a necessity in successful counter-terrorist operations. But, withholding
information for a period of time is not the same as misdirection or
misinformation. The operational necessities, shouldn't, prevent the
operation managers from providing on-going "sanitized" news releases to news
organizations and the public in general, and eventually facts of the story.

The idea is to foster the support of the news media and the public, both for
the government involved, and the operational forces that are attempting to
resolve the crimes or on-going crisis. In effect... it is an attempt to
counter the effects of fear and mistrust being caused by the terrorists.
Further, it may prove useful to actually publicize the successful
intervention/resolution of an act(s), attempted act(s), or the apprehension
of those responsible. To do so may actually act as a deterrent to those that
would commit future acts and certainly help to minimize the detrimental
public effects that terrorists would hope to cause.

In light of these aforementioned observations, one could surmise that a more
proactive response to public opinion formulation would serve American
counter-terrorist forces well. The American press can be expected to be as
vociferous as their brethern in Europe and the Mid-East, if not more so. The
American public hue and cry, in a country that is unaccustomed to insurgent
aassault, can be expected to be loud and demanding. Public careers will
undoubtedly be made or broken, depending on the outcome of given events
surrounding possible frequent acts of violence directed against America.
Much of what occurs and how it is accepted by the public can be determined
by how "the media" and the provision of public information is managed.

One thing is certain. If America's counter-terrorist analysts and operatives
don't manage the American perspective of terrorists, our avowed enemies
will.

© Emergencynet NEWS Service, 1995

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