[iwar] [fc:Intelligence.cooperation.on.the.frontline.of.terrorism:.Easier.Said.Than.Done]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-20 18:45:55
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Intelligence cooperation on the frontline of terrorism: Easier Said Than Done

      Oct. 18, 2001    

In the wake of the events of Sept. 11, a number of voices called for the United 
States to enhance intelligence relationships with other nations, especially those 
with proximity to Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, this intelligence will play an important 
role in managing international terrorism. But the countries on the frontline of the 
terrorist conflict are governed by authoritarian regimes with conflicted priorities 
not always in line with American interests. These nations have intelligence services 
that reflect different ethics regarding intelligence, questionable levels of professionalism, 
problematic internal agendas, and varying degrees of corruption. American intelligence 
officials will confront these problems in their pursuit of timely and accurate information. 


 
Pakistan 

Pakistan is a strong case-in-point. The 40,000 strong Inter-Service Intelligence 
Agency (ISI) exerts a great deal of influence within the Pakistani political dynamic. 
Moreover, the ISI spent much of the last decade financing, supplying, and advising 
the Taliban. Consequently, it has developed an intimate knowledge of the movement, 
and most likely, the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. ISI intelligence would be an 
invaluable resource for the United States. 

But factions within the service are conflicted by President Pervez Musharraf's call 
for the agency to share intelligence with the CIA. On Oct. 7, Musharraf was forced 
to purge some ISI officers sympathetic to the Taliban, including the agency's chief, 
Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad. Several of the officials purged from the ISI and the Pakistani 
military, including Gen. Ahmad, played key roles in the 1999 military coup that placed 
the current regime in power. The ISI is peppered with officers who identify strongly 
with the Taliban and its militant Islamic ideology. 

In late September, a small delegation of Pakistani military and
intelligence officials visited the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar,
reportedly to assist the Taliban in military preparations.  The trip,
which seems to have been a private initiative of these officers,
reflects the degree of resistance to cooperation with America that
exists within some intelligence and military circles in Pakistan. 
Currently, CIA and ISI officials are discussing the ground rules for
conducting covert operations on or originating in Pakistani territory. 
But there are compelling reasons to suspect that disclosure of any
operation to the ISI would mean disclosure to the Taliban as well. 

 
Saudi Arabia

A reluctance to cooperate with U.S.  intelligence officials is also
apparent in Saudi Arabia, and predates the Sept.  11 attacks.  Following
the bombings of U.S.  military installations in Riyadh and Dhahran in
1995-1996, American intelligence officials complained that Saudis denied
access to detained suspects.  Moreover, according to U.S.  officials,
the Saudis were reluctant to discuss any broader implications of the
attacks that might have pointed to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. 

Unlike their counterparts in Pakistan, the reluctance of the Saudi
Directorate of Intelligence to cooperate with U.S.  officials emanates
from the top down.  The directorate reports directly to the King, who
shares the royal family's ambivalence about bin Laden.  As a former
member of the political elite in the Kingdom, Osama bin Laden retains a
nebulous array of contacts within influential circles.  More
importantly, the regime is acutely aware of bin Laden's antipathy to its
reign, as well as his popularity within the conservative religious
establishment.  This community is an important pillar of support for the
House of Saud.  Government efforts to role up al Qaeda and arrest bin
Laden remain a sensitive issue with connotations for Saudi stability. 

After the Sept.  11 attacks, intelligence sharing between the United
States and Saudi Arabia continued to follow this problematic pattern. 
Officials in the administration of President George W.  Bush complain
that the Saudis are failing to cooperate fully with U.S.  intelligence
officials attempting to investigate the hijacking suspects. 


 
Central Asia

The Central Asian states pose a set of unique challenges for American
intelligence and diplomatic officials.  Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan all have a number of intelligence
organizations responsible for providing domestic and foreign
intelligence.  Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have a Committee for
National Security (KNB), thought the latter also has the Barlau, the
external intelligence agency.  In Uzbekistan, the National Security
Service (NSS) handles a broad range of security issues.  Finally, in
Tajikistan, the Ministries of Interior, Security, and Defense share
responsibility for security and intelligence matters. 

These nations are a product of the security vacuum that emerged in the
region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Both Saudi Arabia and
Afghanistan sponsored extremist Islamic insurgencies in Central Asia in
the last decade.  As such, these fledgling states found common interest
in cooperating with the United States on security issues as a hedge
against internal insurgencies and Russian and Chinese pressure. 


Taken together, however, the region characterized by dubious political
systems, tenuous stability, economic stagnation, and seriously flawed
human rights records.  Their security and intelligence services may
possess valuable resources for the United States.  But they are also key
actors in extinguishing even benign internal dissent and propping up
heavily authoritarian personalities.  Moreover, civil control of the
security services cannot be taken for granted.  In Tajikistan, for
instance a small group of commanders use their forces to support
internal fiefdoms.  Corruption is an enduring problem throughout the
region and within the security services.  Clearly, the proximity of the
Central Asian states to Afghanistan enhances their value to the United
States.  But security associations in the region will have to be forged
at the price of U.S.  diplomatic exposure. 

 
Conclusion

If the United States is to penetrate international terrorist networks,
it will need access to resources outside the purview of Western
intelligence sources.  But information provided from the nations listed
above will come with its own set of biases.  There is little reason to
believe that many of these security services approach the business of
intelligence with the concept of neutral analysis that is the ideal of
their Western counterparts.  A reluctance to cooperate, political spin,
selectivity, or simple miscommunications will play a part to corrupt or
obfuscate what may be a wealth of information. 

Sources: U.S.  Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human
Rights: Kazakhstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan.  Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty: Central Asian Report, Washington Post, New York
Time, Las Angeles Times, London Daily Telegraph, The New Yorker. 

 
      By Dr. Michael Donovan 
      CDI Research Assistant 
      <a href="mailto:mdonovan@cdi.org?Subject=Re:%20(ai)%20INTELLIGENCE%20COOPERATION%20ON%20THE%20FRONTLINE%20OF%20TERRORISM:%20Easier%20Said%20Than%20Done%20(CDI)%2526In-Reply-To=%2526lt;002201c159c0$3a12fb80$2bab85ce@oemcomputer">mdonovan@cdi.org</a> 

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