[iwar] 4th Generation Network Warfare in Afghanistan

From: Ravi V Prasad (r_v_p@yahoo.com)
Date: 2001-10-24 02:45:03
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My article carried on the edit page of the Hindustan Times of 
Wednesday, 24 October 2001.

Go to http://www.hindustantimes.com, issue of 24 October 2001, click 
on "Editorial" and then on "Generation Gap".

Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad

================

HINDUSTAN TIMES, 24 OCTOBER 2001, EDIT PAGE

PLATFORM: GENERATION GAP

THE US MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN IS HINDERED BY THE FACT THAT 
IT IS STILL MIRED IN ARCHAIC WORLD WAR II STRATEGIC THINKING. THIS 
WAR IS DIFFERENT AS IT IS AGAINST A 'NETWORKED' ENEMY.

By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad 


Use of the Indian Army in counter-insurgency operations, instead of 
law-enforcement and paramilitary agencies, has been criticized 
on the grounds that it could lead to military commanders gaining 
power at the expense of civilian authorities. However the experience 
gained during anti-guerrilla operations in Kashmir, Punjab, the 
North East, and Sri Lanka, has made the Indian Army one of the few 
that are well equipped to fight a "fourth-generation war". The 
American 
forces trying to oust the Taliban are still mired in a "third-
generation war" mindset, and would do well to learn from their Indian 
and Israeli counterparts if and when they manage to launch ground 
operations on Afghan soil.

Failure to subdue the Taliban even after two weeks of sustained 
bombardment and missile attacks has led American military officials 
to reassess their approach. Many have turned to the forthcoming 
book "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy" by David Ronfeldt, a social scientist at Rand Corporation, 
and John 
Arquilla, a professor of defence analysis at USA's Naval Postgraduate 
School and a consultant at Rand (it will be published by Rand).

A few years ago, some military theorists began drawing analogies 
between practitioners of "fourth-generation warfare" and the 
structure and behaviour of telecommunications and electronic 
networks. The 
internet was specifically designed to survive a nuclear attack. By 
using dynamic rerouting, the internet would continue to function 
even if a large proportion of its nodes and hubs were destroyed.

Following the end of the Cold War, this school of military theorists 
speculated that the West's future opponents would not be traditional 
armies or hierarchical political movements or even organized 
guerrilla forces, but groups that operated like the discrete but 
interconnected 
nodes of a telecommunications network. Ronfeldt and Arquilla 
predicted: "They are likely to be small dispersed organizations who 
coordinate 
and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a 
central command...The information revolution favours the rise of 
network forms of organizations." An American intelligence official 
in the Middle East backed their view: "Our opponents would be a large 
number of small cells, held together by shared ideologies, with no 
membership rolls or chains of command. There would be no central 
leadership where we can knock off the top guys to make them defunct." 
Another gave the example of the Falun Gong: "Under attack from the 
Chinese authorities, Falun Gong evolved from a hierarchical 
structure, not unlike that of the Communist Party, into a non-
hierarchical mass movement whose structure mirrors 
that of the internet, on which it depends."

"Networks and Netwars" is written in the turgid abstract jargon of an 
academic sociologist and a professor of organizational behaviour. But 
since it has become the new mantra of the American generals 
leading the Afghan campaign, it is important to analyze its reasoning 
and recommendations. 

Ronfeldt and Arquilla state that future wars will depend on what they 
term the "Five Levels of Practice" of the protagonists. 

The first is the Organizational Level. The authors describe "all-
channel full-matrix networks", where every member can communicate 
directly with every other member. They draw analogies with peer-to-
peer computing networks such as Napster and Freenet, which provide 
anonymity, remove any single point of failure or control, efficiently 
distribute information, 
and provide plausible deniability for node operators. Several of 
these "all-channel" networks could be combined with numerous "hub-and-
spoke" 
networks to form what they call "sprawling spider's web networks". 
According to the authors, Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida is designed as 
an "all-channel" network, and its interactions with other militant 
Islamic groups take the form of a "spider's web".

The second is the Narrative Level. Narratives are stories told by 
members about their experiences, interests, values and causes: 
who `we' are, why `we' have come together, what makes `us' different 
from `them', what `we' intend to do, and how `we' will do it. For al-
Qaida, these are the Jihad arguments of the demeaning and polluting 
nature of the presence of American troops and non-Muslims on the holy 
soil of Saudi Arabia.

The third is the Doctrinal Level. Doctrines are collaborative 
strategies and methods that enable members to operate tactically 
without having 
to resort to a central command or leader. Doctrines are guiding 
principles and practices that enable members to be "all of one mind" 
even though they are dispersed and devoted to different tasks. 
According 
to David Ignatius of the Washington Post: "When al-Qaida discovered 
that its communications links had been blown, as happened after a 
press leak in 1998, it became further decentralized, so that 
decisions 
were taken by individual cells without requiring authorization from 
some cave in Afghanistan."

The authors identify two doctrinal practices. The first is to have a 
network where no single leader, who could be targeted, stands out. 
Rather, multiple leaders use consultative and consensus-building 
mechanisms for decision making. Communication channels such as email 
keep each member informed so that he knows exactly what to do and how 
to do it without ever reporting to a central leadership. Neo-Nazi 
and white supremacist groups in Germany and USA generally utilize 
this doctrine.

The second is to use swarming strategies and tactics by having myriad 
small mobile units that are normally kept dispersed, turn to converge 
on a target from all directions, conduct a swift coordinated attack, 
and then rapidly redisperse to prepare for the next operation. 
Swarming is analogous to the distributed denial of service attacks on 
the internet which have brought down numerous prominent websites 
since 
2000. al-Qaida's September 11 attacks, Chechen resistance to the 
Russian army, and the Zapatista movement in Mexico are examples of 
swarming.

The fourth level is the Technological Level. These are the 
information and communications systems used by members such as mobile 
phones, SMS text messages, laptop computers and encrypted email.

The fifth is the Social Level. These are the personal ties between 
members (such ties of blood, marriage, friendship, religion, 
ethnicity, schools attended) that ensure loyalty and interpersonal 
trust. The 
Taliban is tightly knit with many of its leaders having graduated 
from the same madrasas and then intermarried.

Regarding the US attack on Afghanistan, the authors state: "Netwar is 
far more about organization and doctrine than about technology". 
According to them, al-Qaida has an overwhelming advantage at the 
organizational level and major advantages at the doctrinal and social 
levels. USA has only marginal advantages at the narrative and 
technological 
levels. They add: "Against al-Qaida's mastery of the swarming 
doctrine, the United States has little to pose."

Ronfeldt and Arquilla postulate that hierarchical organizations have 
a difficult time fighting networks, and state: "Missile strikes 
against Afghanistan suggest that the offensive part of US doctrine 
is based on aging World War II notions of strategic bombardment. This 
is not likely to be a winning approach." They add: "The outdated 
notion of counterleadership targeting continues in the attempt to 
locate and eliminate Osama bin Laden. Although every effort to date 
has failed -- against Muammar Qadhaffi in 1986, Saddam Hussein in 
1991, Mohammed Aideed in 1993, and Osama bin Laden himself in 1998 
-- the US keeps trying yet again as elimination of leaders is such a 
deep part of its doctrinal paradigm." Postulating that "it takes 
networks to fight networks", they recommend that USA should develop a 
whole new doctrine based on swarming concepts for dealing with 
Afghanistan.

Ronfeldt and Arquilla also have some advice for Osama bin Laden: "For 
al-Qaida, the organizational challenge lies in ensuring that their 
network is not simply a single hub designed around Osama bin Laden, 
as his death or capture would signal their defeat...The more 
a terrorist network takes the form of a multi-hub spiders-web design, 
with multiple centers and peripheries, the more redundant and 
resilient 
it will be - and the harder to defeat...al-Qaida's solid doctrinal 
and social underpinnings would be further enhanced and its 
vulnerabilities 
removed, if it expanded from the hub revolving around Osama bin 
Laden."

Although "Networks and Netwars" has become the new Bible of American 
generals, it would be naive to attribute Osama bin Laden's current 
superiority solely to al-Qaida's networked organizational structure, 
as the book implies. Afghanistan's terrain is a crucial factor. 
According to Colonel Bob Stewart of the British Army who commanded 
the United Nations forces in Bosnia, the West would not be able to 
locate Osama bin Laden even with all their satellite imaging 
technologies. Warning that bombing Afghanistan would 
be "exceptionally 
counterproductive", Stewart said that a "long, thin war" was what was 
required, using "political, diplomatic, financial and social 
instruments, in addition to military ones".

At the practical level, it is only the Indian Army which has 
experience in dealing with network-based organizations such as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, 
Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammed, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-
Ansar and Al Barq. NATO officers would do well to learn from the 
practical 
experiences of Indian field commanders.

However, the practical experience gained in Kashmir and the North 
East needs to be crystallized and institutionalized so that it can be 
transferred to future generations of officers. Organizations 
such as the National Defence College and the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses should immediately start a research and analysis 
program for modeling, simulation and visualization of network-based 
warfare. 

================
The author heads c4i, a group that analyzes fourth generation warfare 
and command, control, communications and computers intelligence in 
South Asia.

By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad 

=======================================================

Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
rvp@lycos.com, rvp@excite.com, rvp@yifan.net
Phones : [11] 526-5439, Faxes: [11] 526-6868, 527-6386
Mail : Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad 
19, Maitri Apts, A - 3 Paschim Vihar
New Delhi, 110 063
http://42.4t.com, http://37.s5.com





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