Return-Path: <sentto-279987-3361-1003916943-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Wed, 24 Oct 2001 02:50:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 29794 invoked by uid 510); 24 Oct 2001 09:48:31 -0000 Received: from n30.groups.yahoo.com (216.115.96.80) by 204.181.12.215 with SMTP; 24 Oct 2001 09:48:31 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-3361-1003916943-fc=all.net@returns.onelist.com Received: from [10.1.4.53] by n30.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 24 Oct 2001 09:49:03 -0000 X-Sender: r_v_p@yahoo.com X-Apparently-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 24 Oct 2001 09:49:03 -0000 Received: (qmail 25107 invoked from network); 24 Oct 2001 09:49:02 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l7.egroups.com with QMQP; 24 Oct 2001 09:49:02 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO web11601.mail.yahoo.com) (216.136.172.53) by mta1 with SMTP; 24 Oct 2001 09:49:02 -0000 Message-ID: <20011024094902.99896.qmail@web11601.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [203.94.242.162] by web11601.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Wed, 24 Oct 2001 02:49:02 PDT To: c4i@yahoogroups.com, pak-india@yahoogroups.com, iwar@yahoogroups.com From: Ravi V Prasad <r_v_p@yahoo.com> X-Yahoo-Profile: r_v_p Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 02:49:02 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Subject: [iwar] Article on Networked 4th generation warfare against Al Qaida Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit My article carried on the edit page of the Hindustan Times of Wednesday, 24 October 2001. Go to http://www.hindustantimes.com, issue of 24 October 2001, click on "Editorial" and then on "Generation Gap". Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad ================ HINDUSTAN TIMES, 24 OCTOBER 2001, EDIT PAGE PLATFORM: GENERATION GAP THE US MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN IS HINDERED BY THE FACT THAT IT IS STILL MIRED IN ARCHAIC WORLD WAR II STRATEGIC THINKING. THIS WAR IS DIFFERENT AS IT IS AGAINST A 'NETWORKED' ENEMY. By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad Use of the Indian Army in counter-insurgency operations, instead of law-enforcement and paramilitary agencies, has been criticized on the grounds that it could lead to military commanders gaining power at the expense of civilian authorities. However the experience gained during anti-guerrilla operations in Kashmir, Punjab, the North East, and Sri Lanka, has made the Indian Army one of the few that are well equipped to fight a “fourth-generation war”. The American forces trying to oust the Taliban are still mired in a “third-generation war” mindset, and would do well to learn from their Indian and Israeli counterparts if and when they manage to launch ground operations on Afghan soil. Failure to subdue the Taliban even after two weeks of sustained bombardment and missile attacks has led American military officials to reassess their approach. Many have turned to the forthcoming book “Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy” by David Ronfeldt, a social scientist at Rand Corporation, and John Arquilla, a professor of defence analysis at USA’s Naval Postgraduate School and a consultant at Rand (it will be published by Rand). A few years ago, some military theorists began drawing analogies between practitioners of “fourth-generation warfare” and the structure and behaviour of telecommunications and electronic networks. The internet was specifically designed to survive a nuclear attack. By using dynamic rerouting, the internet would continue to function even if a large proportion of its nodes and hubs were destroyed. Following the end of the Cold War, this school of military theorists speculated that the West’s future opponents would not be traditional armies or hierarchical political movements or even organized guerrilla forces, but groups that operated like the discrete but interconnected nodes of a telecommunications network. Ronfeldt and Arquilla predicted: “They are likely to be small dispersed organizations who coordinate and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a central command...The information revolution favours the rise of network forms of organizations.” An American intelligence official in the Middle East backed their view: “Our opponents would be a large number of small cells, held together by shared ideologies, with no membership rolls or chains of command. There would be no central leadership where we can knock off the top guys to make them defunct.” Another gave the example of the Falun Gong: “Under attack from the Chinese authorities, Falun Gong evolved from a hierarchical structure, not unlike that of the Communist Party, into a non-hierarchical mass movement whose structure mirrors that of the internet, on which it depends.” “Networks and Netwars” is written in the turgid abstract jargon of an academic sociologist and a professor of organizational behaviour. But since it has become the new mantra of the American generals leading the Afghan campaign, it is important to analyze its reasoning and recommendations. Ronfeldt and Arquilla state that future wars will depend on what they term the “Five Levels of Practice” of the protagonists. The first is the Organizational Level. The authors describe “all-channel full-matrix networks”, where every member can communicate directly with every other member. They draw analogies with peer-to-peer computing networks such as Napster and Freenet, which provide anonymity, remove any single point of failure or control, efficiently distribute information, and provide plausible deniability for node operators. Several of these “all-channel” networks could be combined with numerous “hub-and-spoke” networks to form what they call “sprawling spider’s web networks”. According to the authors, Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida is designed as an “all-channel” network, and its interactions with other militant Islamic groups take the form of a “spider’s web”. The second is the Narrative Level. Narratives are stories told by members about their experiences, interests, values and causes: who ‘we’ are, why ‘we’ have come together, what makes ‘us’ different from ‘them’, what ‘we’ intend to do, and how ‘we’ will do it. For al-Qaida, these are the Jihad arguments of the demeaning and polluting nature of the presence of American troops and non-Muslims on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia. The third is the Doctrinal Level. Doctrines are collaborative strategies and methods that enable members to operate tactically without having to resort to a central command or leader. Doctrines are guiding principles and practices that enable members to be “all of one mind” even though they are dispersed and devoted to different tasks. According to David Ignatius of the Washington Post: “When al-Qaida discovered that its communications links had been blown, as happened after a press leak in 1998, it became further decentralized, so that decisions were taken by individual cells without requiring authorization from some cave in Afghanistan.” The authors identify two doctrinal practices. The first is to have a network where no single leader, who could be targeted, stands out. Rather, multiple leaders use consultative and consensus-building mechanisms for decision making. Communication channels such as email keep each member informed so that he knows exactly what to do and how to do it without ever reporting to a central leadership. Neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups in Germany and USA generally utilize this doctrine. The second is to use swarming strategies and tactics by having myriad small mobile units that are normally kept dispersed, turn to converge on a target from all directions, conduct a swift coordinated attack, and then rapidly redisperse to prepare for the next operation. Swarming is analogous to the distributed denial of service attacks on the internet which have brought down numerous prominent websites since 2000. al-Qaida’s September 11 attacks, Chechen resistance to the Russian army, and the Zapatista movement in Mexico are examples of swarming. The fourth level is the Technological Level. These are the information and communications systems used by members such as mobile phones, SMS text messages, laptop computers and encrypted email. The fifth is the Social Level. These are the personal ties between members (such ties of blood, marriage, friendship, religion, ethnicity, schools attended) that ensure loyalty and interpersonal trust. The Taliban is tightly knit with many of its leaders having graduated from the same madrasas and then intermarried. Regarding the US attack on Afghanistan, the authors state: “Netwar is far more about organization and doctrine than about technology”. According to them, al-Qaida has an overwhelming advantage at the organizational level and major advantages at the doctrinal and social levels. USA has only marginal advantages at the narrative and technological levels. They add: “Against al-Qaida’s mastery of the swarming doctrine, the United States has little to pose.” Ronfeldt and Arquilla postulate that hierarchical organizations have a difficult time fighting networks, and state: “Missile strikes against Afghanistan suggest that the offensive part of US doctrine is based on aging World War II notions of strategic bombardment. This is not likely to be a winning approach.” They add: “The outdated notion of counterleadership targeting continues in the attempt to locate and eliminate Osama bin Laden. Although every effort to date has failed -- against Muammar Qadhaffi in 1986, Saddam Hussein in 1991, Mohammed Aideed in 1993, and Osama bin Laden himself in 1998 -- the US keeps trying yet again as elimination of leaders is such a deep part of its doctrinal paradigm.” Postulating that “it takes networks to fight networks”, they recommend that USA should develop a whole new doctrine based on swarming concepts for dealing with Afghanistan. Ronfeldt and Arquilla also have some advice for Osama bin Laden: “For al-Qaida, the organizational challenge lies in ensuring that their network is not simply a single hub designed around Osama bin Laden, as his death or capture would signal their defeat...The more a terrorist network takes the form of a multi-hub spiders-web design, with multiple centers and peripheries, the more redundant and resilient it will be - and the harder to defeat...al-Qaida’s solid doctrinal and social underpinnings would be further enhanced and its vulnerabilities removed, if it expanded from the hub revolving around Osama bin Laden.” Although “Networks and Netwars” has become the new Bible of American generals, it would be naive to attribute Osama bin Laden’s current superiority solely to al-Qaida’s networked organizational structure, as the book implies. Afghanistan’s terrain is a crucial factor. According to Colonel Bob Stewart of the British Army who commanded the United Nations forces in Bosnia, the West would not be able to locate Osama bin Laden even with all their satellite imaging technologies. Warning that bombing Afghanistan would be “exceptionally counterproductive”, Stewart said that a “long, thin war” was what was required, using “political, diplomatic, financial and social instruments, in addition to military ones”. At the practical level, it is only the Indian Army which has experience in dealing with network-based organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammed, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Al Barq. NATO officers would do well to learn from the practical experiences of Indian field commanders. However, the practical experience gained in Kashmir and the North East needs to be crystallized and institutionalized so that it can be transferred to future generations of officers. Organizations such as the National Defence College and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses should immediately start a research and analysis program for modeling, simulation and visualization of network-based warfare. ================ The author heads c4i, a group that analyzes fourth generation warfare and command, control, communications and computers intelligence in South Asia. By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad ======================================================= Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad rvp@lycos.com, rvp@excite.com, rvp@yifan.net Phones : [11] 526-5439, Faxes: [11] 526-6868, 527-6386 Mail : Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad 19, Maitri Apts, A - 3 Paschim Vihar New Delhi, 110 063 http://42.4t.com, http://37.s5.com __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Make a great connection at Yahoo! Personals. http://personals.yahoo.com ------------------------ Yahoo! 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