[iwar] Is there a hidden strategic goal in current attacks?

From: Charles Preston (cpreston@sinbad.net)
Date: 2001-10-26 10:48:41


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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 09:48:41 -0800
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [iwar] Is there a hidden strategic goal in current attacks?
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I wonder if someone's strategic thinking could be along these lines of
deception?
Two incidents don't make a clear pattern, but...

Target : U.S.

Conventional total military defeat: High risk and low probability of success

Destruction by biological weapons: No current way to blanket the U.S. and
still limit spread

Economic destruction by loss of confidence and efficiency from attacks on
physical targets and systems (transportation and mail): Damage is assured
but short-term destruction not likely

Plan:
Encourage a shift from transportation and physical communication to
electronic.  Transportation system attacks promote video conferencing,
instant messaging, and email.  Biological attacks discourage physical
exchange of messages and promote the same electronic means of communication.
Infectious biological attacks will discourage face-to-face contact, again
encouraging electronic communication.  The increased threats of biological
and chemical attacks also greatly increase costs for everyday items
including food and water, and for all shipped goods, impacting productivity.

Increase dependence on communication and computing for bill-paying (cash
flow from individuals) company-company payments, ordering of goods, and
dissemination of news.

After the current trend of increasing dependence on communications and
computing has been accelerated,  and the cost of interruption is higher, use
currently known methods to attack this infrastructure, causing enough
economic disruption for long enough to make collapse likely.

If normal lack of attention to secure design and coding isn't good enough,
at the current rate of replacement for routers, computers and operating
systems, a couple hundred people placed strategically in the right major
companies and subcontractors could provide a substantial boost in covert
weak points within 2 years.  According to remarks by one software industry
spokesperson, a technical team leader for even one small subset of an
operating system, such as encryption, cannot inspect and know the function
of each line of code.  A major advantage of this approach is that most
previous and current attention to software/hardware sabotage in the U.S. has
probably been directed toward weapons and military systems.

cmp




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