Re: [iwar] Is there a hidden strategic goal in current attacks?

From: e.r. (fastflyer28@yahoo.com)
Date: 2001-10-26 22:10:35


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From: "e.r." <fastflyer28@yahoo.com>
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 22:10:35 -0700 (PDT)
Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [iwar] Is there a hidden strategic goal in current attacks?
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You have the percentages on terrorism down as well as the Joint
Chiefs-low probability of success, but if you get through, high
probability of damage on a horrific scale.---
 Charles Preston <cpreston@sinbad.net> wrote:
> I wonder if someone's strategic thinking could be along these lines
> of
> deception?
> Two incidents don't make a clear pattern, but...
> 
> Target : U.S.
> 
> Conventional total military defeat: High risk and low probability of
> success
> 
> Destruction by biological weapons: No current way to blanket the U.S.
> and
> still limit spread
> 
> Economic destruction by loss of confidence and efficiency from
> attacks on
> physical targets and systems (transportation and mail): Damage is
> assured
> but short-term destruction not likely
> 
> Plan:
> Encourage a shift from transportation and physical communication to
> electronic.  Transportation system attacks promote video
> conferencing,
> instant messaging, and email.  Biological attacks discourage physical
> exchange of messages and promote the same electronic means of
> communication.
> Infectious biological attacks will discourage face-to-face contact,
> again
> encouraging electronic communication.  The increased threats of
> biological
> and chemical attacks also greatly increase costs for everyday items
> including food and water, and for all shipped goods, impacting
> productivity.
> 
> Increase dependence on communication and computing for bill-paying
> (cash
> flow from individuals) company-company payments, ordering of goods,
> and
> dissemination of news.
> 
> After the current trend of increasing dependence on communications
> and
> computing has been accelerated,  and the cost of interruption is
> higher, use
> currently known methods to attack this infrastructure, causing enough
> economic disruption for long enough to make collapse likely.
> 
> If normal lack of attention to secure design and coding isn't good
> enough,
> at the current rate of replacement for routers, computers and
> operating
> systems, a couple hundred people placed strategically in the right
> major
> companies and subcontractors could provide a substantial boost in
> covert
> weak points within 2 years.  According to remarks by one software
> industry
> spokesperson, a technical team leader for even one small subset of an
> operating system, such as encryption, cannot inspect and know the
> function
> of each line of code.  A major advantage of this approach is that
> most
> previous and current attention to software/hardware sabotage in the
> U.S. has
> probably been directed toward weapons and military systems.
> 
> cmp
> 
> 
> 
> 


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