[iwar] [fc:New.snags.in.US-Saudi.ties.play.to.bin.Laden]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-10-28 16:35:52
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New snags in US-Saudi ties play to bin Laden | csmonitor.com

US relations with Saudi Arabia - the world's largest oil producer, beset
with rising Islamic radicalism and US criticism for lack of cooperation
against terrorism - are severely strained. 

Mr.  bin Laden himself might have written such a script to set the stage
for a combined assault to topple the royal family of Saudi Arabia and
end the US military presence in the Persian Gulf.  But the tense
relations between Washington and Riyadh are largely the fault of
Americans and Saudis who seem, inexplicably, to be playing into bin
Laden's grand scheme. 

"If the terrorists were to read this stuff, they would like it," says
Ibrahim Karawan, director of the Middle East Center at the University of
Utah.  He says the terrorists must be thinking: "Not only did we inflict
this heavy blow in Washington and New York, but we got those who were
close friends to turn on each other."

With civilian casualties in Afghanistan mounting and the Islamic holy
month of Ramadan fast approaching, the critical Muslim core of the
US-led coalition against terrorism is growing increasingly alarmed about
supporting what they see as open-ended carnage in a fellow-Islamic
state. 

Among those most concerned are bin Laden's No.  1 target, the king and
ruling princes of Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi royal family has demonstrated
its capacity to survive difficult and dangerous challenges, including a
November 1979 attempt by armed Muslim extremists to overthrow the Al
Saud family by seizing the Grand Mosque in Mecca. 

Rising opposition

But some analysts say the Saudis have never faced such concerted
opposition from so many different quarters at once - including harsh
criticism from US senators about Saudi reluctance to cooperate fully in
the terrorism war.  In addition, the royal family can't be sure about
the activities of several thousand Saudis who presumably have been
trained and primed by bin Laden for martyrdom missions. 

"They are in uncharted territory," says a long-time Saudi political
analyst who asked not to be identified by name.  "They are operating in
an environment where they don't have solid ground under their feet."

Though there has been a series of recent missteps, they need not be
fatal to US-Saudi relations, says F.  Gregory Gause, a Middle East
expert at the University of Vermont.  "The underlying common interests
between the US and Saudi Arabia are still there, but there is a growing
sentiment of mistrust on both sides."

In the most basic terms, the common interests boil down to US access to
a steady flow of oil in exchange for guaranteed security for Saudi
Arabia from external military threats. 

There is a secondary American interest as well.  Over the past decade,
the Saudis have spent an estimated $170 billion for military equipment. 
And last summer the Saudis awarded contracts potentially worth $50
billion to upgrade the kingdom's gas production facilities.  The vast
majority of those sales and contracts went to US companies. 

The royal family's interest in authorizing such huge contracts stems in
part from the ability to receive huge commissions for setting up the
deals, government critics charge.  And it has prompted some Saudis to
wonder why, after spending billions on defense, are American military
personnel still needed in the kingdom?

Mr.  Gause says the recent tension in the US-Saudi relationship stems
from a "disconnect" between the two.  "Here in the states, people get
the impression that we did the Saudis a favor back in 1990 [winning the
Gulf War], and that now they are not repaying us," he says.  But the
Saudis don't view 1990 as having been a favor - rather it was a
reflection of US-Saudi common interests, he says.  They don't have a
sense of common interest in the current fight against terrorism, Gause
says, adding, "They seem to have a tough time realizing how important
what happened on Sept.  11 is to us." One key concern raised by several
analysts is whether recent criticisms from US officials and the American
media signal a genuine desire by Washington to undermine or abandon the
royal family. 

"If we are deliberately trying to weaken the House of Saud - and that
seems to be what we are trying to do - don't these people have any idea
who is going to replace the royal family?" asks a US-based analyst with
detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the kingdom.  "If there is a
revolution in Saudi Arabia - God forbid - it is not going to be
Jeffersonian democrats or PhDs from Stanford who take over," he says. 
"It is going to be the Saudi version of the Taliban."

A former prime minister of Jordan, who asked not to be identified by
name, also questions Washington's motives.  "There is a general idea in
the region that the United States does not stand by its friends," he
says.  "The British back their friends up to the end.  But the Americans
follow only their own interests." The former prime minister adds, "So
the Al Saud [family] have something to worry about."

Caught between their allies in Washington and their Arab and Islamic
brothers in the region, the ruling Al Saud family has had to walk a
strategic tightrope to avoid provoking or offending one side or the
other.  They have never been entirely successful in either endeavor. 

On one side, regional and domestic forces are pressuring the regime to
take more hard-line stands in accord with key concerns of the Arab and
Islamic worlds.  These include outrage over a lack of US action to
protect Palestinians from Israeli violations of international law,
widespread anger over harm to Iraqi civilians of the US-backed embargo
against Baghdad, and, most recently, concern about civilian casualties
in Afghanistan. 

On the other side are those in Washington urging the Saudis to draw ever
closer to the West and its policies.  US officials are pressing the
Saudis to become more proactive in hunting down possible suspects in the
Sept.  11 attack and moving more forcefully to seize and freeze
financial assets of those suspected of helping bin Laden and Al Qaeda. 
The problem is the Saudis have long balked at revealing any information
to the West that might suggest a degree of vulnerability by the royal
family.  And Saudi officials don't want to appear to be functioning as
American puppets identifying Saudi-Muslim suspects who might then face
extradition for trial in a Western, non-Islamic legal system. 

Saudi support

Despite such reservations, the Saudis have cooperated in two key areas. 
They permit a contingent of several thousand US military forces on Saudi
soil to patrol the southern no-fly zone in Iraq.  And the Saudis are
supporting the US-led coalition by providing access to highly
sophisticated air-warfare facilities at Prince Sultan Airbase southeast
of Riyadh, where US military leaders are coordinating and directing many
of the air attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan. 

Even this kind of assistance to the US is extremely problematic for the
Saudis, some analysts say, because of serious unresolved religious
questions about the propriety of an Islamic nation helping a non-Islamic
nation - the US - attack and destroy an Islamic government.  The Saudis
had diplomatic relations with the Taliban government until Sept.  25. 

Bin Laden has made clear his position on the issue, and a number of
dissident Muslim clerics in Saudi Arabia appear to agree with him.  The
Saudis have responded with statements from clerics endorsed by the
royals.  But analysts say there is a brisk exchange of dissident tapes,
literature, and other information among a broad number of Saudis who do
not support bin Laden and his extremist views, but who are uneasy about
the state of affairs in the kingdom. 

Despite this activity, most analysts contacted for this article say they
believe the royal family will survive the current challenges.  "I think
they will get through it," says James Akins, a former US ambassador to
Saudi Arabia.  "You can't say that an absolute monarchy is the wave of
the future, but I don't think that a regressive religious dictatorship
is the wave of the future either," he says.  "The royal family can
change....  They are moving toward representative government."

Professor Karawan sees a more basic approach as necessary to help
protect the Saudis.  "It is time to pause, and think, and compare
notes," he says.  "We should figure out what [the terrorists] want us to
do, and not do it."

Copyright © 2001 The Christian Science Monitor.  All rights reserved. 


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