[iwar] [fc:War.Driving:.Computing.mobility.opens.networks.to.an.invasion.of.the.wireless.snatchers.]

From: Fred Cohen (fc@all.net)
Date: 2001-11-29 16:41:04


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Subject: [iwar] [fc:War.Driving:.Computing.mobility.opens.networks.to.an.invasion.of.the.wireless.snatchers.]
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War Driving: Computing mobility opens networks to an invasion of the wireless snatchers.

By Sandra Kay Miller, Information Security, 11/29/2001
<a href="http://www.infosecuritymag.com/articles/november01/technology_wardriving.shtml">http://www.infosecuritymag.com/articles/november01/technology_wardriving.shtml>

In the 1980s, hackers began "war dialing"--dialing phone numbers until
they found an open modem--to access networks. The '90s Internet boom
created easier and more direct avenues of attack, such as IP scanners
and packet sniffers. Enter the next generation of nefarious network
intrusion: war driving. 
Literally, war driving is using a laptop's wireless NIC set in
promiscuous mode to pick up unsecured wireless LAN signals. At this
stage of the game, hackers are war driving--or "LAN-jacking," as it's
sometimes called--wireless networks for anonymous and free high-speed
Internet access, akin to stealing long-distance phone service.

Chris "Weld Pond" Wysopal, director of research and development at
@stake (www.atstake.com), says the potential for wireless network
intrusion is "absolutely huge," since the number of wireless LANs is
rapidly expanding. "War driving is as cheap as the war dialing that
started the growth of the computer underground after the movie War
Games, for which it was named. A wireless Ethernet card is $100, far
cheaper than a modem in 1985," Wysopal says. "A person who wants to take
advantage of war driving only needs to drive a couple miles if they are
in a populated area before they will find a wide-open network, which
they can peruse at will or simply use as an anonymous Internet
connection."

Affordable and easy-to-use wireless LANs are being deployed not only by
traditional IT folks, but by anyone who can plug a CAT5 cable into a
hub. Wireless access points are boxes (usually routers) that have
Ethernet going in one side and wireless antennas out the other. 
It's a general misconception that 802.11b wireless signals have a
limited transmission radius. However, many war driving aficionados
report that they can identify wireless LANs within six city blocks using
a simple omnidirectional antenna in conjunction with their wireless NIC.

Another frequent factor in wireless network breaches comes from
corporate and personal users' false impression that the Service Set
Identifier (SSID), which is attached to packets sent over the wireless
LAN, functions as a secret password. 
In September, Al Potter, manager of the Network Security Labs at ICSA
Labs, a division of TruSecure Corp. (www.trusecure.com), conducted an
unobtrusive test that demonstrated war driving is more than just
theoretical. While driving at 65 mph between Leesburg, Va., and Dulles
International Airport near Washington, D.C., he detected "dozens" of
unsecured wireless LANs.

"I do not understand why individuals and companies are continuing to
expose themselves this way," says Potter. (TruSecure publishes
Information Security .)

War driving requires no elaborate software or hardware. An ordinary
consumer wireless NIC set in promiscuous mode will easily latch on to
open wireless network beacons. Using a Global Positioning Satellite
(GPS) receiver in conjunction with wireless NICs, crackers are mapping
major metropolitan areas and compiling a quasi-telephone book of
wireless networks, both secured and unsecured.

For those curious about increasing their ability to pick up wireless
networks, a number of antennas, both commercial varieties and homemade
models, are listed online. A 3 dB omnidirectional antenna that can
easily be mounted to the hood of a car sells for around $60. But a true
gearhead can pick up a 24 dB hand-held parabolic grid antenna for not
much more than loose change. For the do-it-yourselfer, directions and
templates are readily available online for making antennas with brass
tubing, scrap metal and a little wood and wire. Simply put, the
technology and equipment for war driving is cheap and readily available,
which makes it all the more dangerous for wireless networkers.

Software that facilitates locating wireless networks is also readily
available on the Web. Network Stumbler is a popular Windows utility for
war driving that scans for 802.11b networks and logs all the signals it
locks on to--including the real SSIDs, the AP's MAC address, the best
signal-to-noise ratio encountered and the duration of time the network
was accessed. By adding a GPS receiver to the laptop, the program even
logs the exact latitude and longitude of the AP. IBM has a similar
product, Wireless Security Auditor, which works with Linux on an iPAQ
PDA. For FreeBSD fans, Peter Shipley has posted a Perl script that
plucks latitude/ longitude information from a GPS unit and converts it
into detailed maps of a user's LAN-jacking activities. 
Defending "Air"

Given the prevalence of these tools, IT managers and CIOs will need to
incorporate wireless threats into their overall security programs. IT
policies should be updated to reflect the risks of wireless devices
connected to the corporate network. Network admins would also be wise to
research and institute wireless security measures specific to their
needs and establish a metric for auditing their wireless
vulnerabilities.

There are a number of deterrents to war drivers. But again, thanks to
the plug-and-play capabilities of wireless LANs, the lack of security is
often as simple as changing the default settings during installation of
a wireless network. The Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) system is the
encryption standard used by 802.11b wireless networks. However, WEP is
undermined by common mistakes, including the failure to activate it
entirely or engage WEP with the encryption key set to the default value.
Initializing WEP on the wireless LAN will deter casual war drivers, but
will do little against sophisticated hackers with a more sinister
agenda.

A more secure scenario, recommended by the 802.11 working group, is
overlaying WEP with a secondary layer of security, such as a VPN or
IPSec. Another security method is to install a firewall and/or a DMZ
between the wireless and wired segments of the network.

As with hackers of previous generations, there's always going to be
someone who wants to dig a little deeper. Recently, programs have
appeared on the Internet aimed at breaking WEP encryption keys. AirSnort
has the ability to intercept and analyze WEP-protected wireless traffic.
By collecting enough packets, a system's master password can be acquired
from 100MB to 1GB of traffic. WEPCrack is a tool using weaknesses in the
RC4 key scheduling to crack the encryption keys.

War drivers are the cowboys of the "Wireless West," taking advantage of
everything from the casual drive-by of a completely unprotected access
point for free Web surfing to capturing proprietary data. If you see
someone cruising the neighborhood in his SUV sporting a multitude of
antennas on the roof and a laptop on the dashboard, you can be sure
you've spotted a new breed of hacker--the war driver.

SANDRA KAY MILLER (<a href="mailto:sandra@pa.net?Subject=Re:%20(ai)%20War%20Driving:%20Computing%20mobility%20opens%20networks%20to%20an%20invasion%20of%2526In-Reply-To=%2526lt;200111291421.fATELia22342@smtpsrv2.mitre.org">sandra@pa.net</a>) 
is a freelance journalist based in
Pennsylvania with more than 12 years experience covering technology. Her
work routinely appears in InfoWorld, IEEE's Computer Magazine and
Midrange Computing Showcase.

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