Return-Path: <sentto-279987-5125-1028691286-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com> Delivered-To: fc@all.net Received: from 204.181.12.215 [204.181.12.215] by localhost with POP3 (fetchmail-5.7.4) for fc@localhost (single-drop); Tue, 06 Aug 2002 20:37:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 4435 invoked by uid 510); 7 Aug 2002 03:33:30 -0000 Received: from n27.grp.scd.yahoo.com (66.218.66.83) by all.net with SMTP; 7 Aug 2002 03:33:30 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-279987-5125-1028691286-fc=all.net@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [66.218.66.96] by n27.grp.scd.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 07 Aug 2002 03:34:46 -0000 X-Sender: fc@red.all.net X-Apparently-To: iwar@onelist.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_7_4); 7 Aug 2002 03:34:46 -0000 Received: (qmail 49582 invoked from network); 7 Aug 2002 03:34:46 -0000 Received: from unknown (66.218.66.216) by m13.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 7 Aug 2002 03:34:46 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO red.all.net) (12.232.72.152) by mta1.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 7 Aug 2002 03:34:45 -0000 Received: (from fc@localhost) by red.all.net (8.11.2/8.11.2) id g773YvZ24581 for iwar@onelist.com; Tue, 6 Aug 2002 20:34:57 -0700 Message-Id: <200208070334.g773YvZ24581@red.all.net> To: iwar@onelist.com (Information Warfare Mailing List) Organization: I'm not allowed to say X-Mailer: don't even ask X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.5 PL3] From: Fred Cohen <fc@all.net> X-Yahoo-Profile: fcallnet Mailing-List: list iwar@yahoogroups.com; contact iwar-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com> Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2002 20:34:57 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [iwar] [fc:IDF.may.be.forced.to.`reboot'.its.information.revolution] Reply-To: iwar@yahoogroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, hits=0.0 required=5.0 tests=DIFFERENT_REPLY_TO version=2.20 X-Spam-Level: Ha'aretzTuesday, August 06, 2002 Av 28, 5762Israel Time: 13:37 (GMT+3) IDF may be forced to `reboot' its information revolution By Amnon Barzilai Barely a few months after the launch of a prestigious IDF technology project in the Ground Forces Command (GFC) to use the information revolution to "digitalize the ground forces," the project is under investigation with charges that tens of millions of shekels have been wasted. The project is an ambitious, costly GFC plan to establish an overall command and control (CAC) system for all the ground forces in the battlefield of the future. It is meant to provide a real-time picture of the battle to all levels of the army, from the individual soldier in the field, up the chain of command to corps commanders and command generals. The overall mission of the project, which is expected to take 15 years to deploy and cost NIS 1.5 billion, is to integrate all the CAC systems of the ground forces and link them to the General Staff's overall CAC system in the army's headquarters at the Kirya. But even before the project got fully under way, the General Staff was bombarded with complaints about failures, and a loss of command and control in the project. All the blame is falling on the GFC. One weighty charge is that the GFC itself has yet to formulate an overall concept for the project. The GFC's commanders, which includes the armored corps, the infantry, artillery and engineering, are inexperienced at managing very large projects. And the digitalization of the GFC's command and control system is an enormous project, requiring the experience of a major general who has commanded corps, regional commands and has the kind of broad view, including diplomatic know-how, that is derived from being a member of the general staff. Therefore much of the criticism is directed at Maj. Gen. Yiftah Ron Tal, commander of the GFC, who until his promotion to head the GFC had served as a division commander and as head of the GFC staff. This is his first command as a major general and his critics say it is beyond his capabilities. Two weeks ago, Deputy Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi took the unusual step of appointing an investigating officer for the project. Complaints about the project arose already in the beginning of the year. Elron Telesoft was hired as a contractor, two buildings were built, 50-60 software people from the civilian market and the army were taken on for the project. Complaints then were focused on a lack of coordination between the GFC demands for the program and what the Communications Corps was capable of turning into reality. Already then, assistant head of strategic planning, Yitzhak Harel, proposed an outside investigation, but because of the change of personnel in the chief of staff's office, the proposal was shelved. Harel meanwhile has been promoted to major general and appointed head of the northern corps. He was replaced by naval officer Brigadier General Ophir Shoham, a physicist and expert on military technologies, who confirmed Harel's findings, but recommended that an internal investigation take place. Ashkenazi gave the job to a lieutenant colonel, also from the navy, with expertise in technology. The reason for choosing a navy man: the navy has nothing to do with the project. Beneath the surface, two other battles are taking place. One is between GFC and the various technology units of the Technology and Logistics Department and the Communications Corps, over authority. The question is who will really control the project - and get control of the huge budgets involved. The other battle is between the companies chosen for the project and the Israel Aircrafts Industries, which has so far been shut out of the project. In June, the Defense Ministry decided to give Elbit Systems and not IAI the main contractor's role in the project. That decision was made without a tender. Elbit brought in Rafael and Tadiran Systems. Companies like the IAI, Tadiran Communications and Ness Technologies were angry at being shut out of what is considered the most prestigious technology project undertaken by the IDF in the last 15 years. The investigation into the GFC's management of the project now raises doubts about the GFC vision for the digitalization of the ground forces, precisely because of the GFC's position in the army. The issue was identified during a discussion in the deputy chief of staff's office. The GFC wants to establish a complete CAC system for the army, but in effect, the commander of the ground forces is the chief of staff, not the head of the GFC. Therefore, as long as the general staff has not integrated its command of the forces, it will be impossible to fulfill the digital revolution of the ground forces. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Will You Find True Love? Will You Meet the One? Free Love Reading by phone! http://us.click.yahoo.com/it_ffB/R_ZEAA/Ey.GAA/kgFolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ------------------ http://all.net/ Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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