[iwar] On Guerrilla Warfare

"Fourth Generation Warfare" vs. "Maoist Guerrilla Warfare"

Is there a mismatch? (You bet there is...)

How To Fight Fourth Generation War"

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/lind_12_05_03.htm

The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the
ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no
magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the
outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be
able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they
do. But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:

      If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of
maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement.
The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the
failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood,
fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we
need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster
on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just
bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own
weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S.
Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15
kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could
sustain 40 kilometers.

      Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva
Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how
our war with them would be fought? Itbs worth exploring.

      How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as
important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.

      What the Marine Corps calls bcultural intelligenceb is of vital
importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the
Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.

      What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The
seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not
clear all U.S. SOF understand this.

      One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible
with the local people.

      Unfortunately, the American doctrine of bforce protectionb works
against integration and generally hurts us badly. Herebs a quote from
the minutes of the seminar:

There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way
is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves
from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more
viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate
with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and
the population protects you. The British approach of getting the
helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.

      What bwinsb at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the
operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided.
Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in
Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than
it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American
military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms
of comparative attrition rates.

      We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not
the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

      What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and
National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of
what they know?

Maoist doctrine on the Web:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/

Written: 1937
Source: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. IX
Transcription/Markup: Maoist Documentation Project/Brian Basgen
Online Version: Maoist Documentation Project (2000); Mao Tse-tung Reference Archive (marxists.org) 2000

Written by Mao in 1937, when Japanese imperialists occupied all of China, this book served as an instruction manual for guerrilla fighting, written based on more than a decade of personal experience by Mao. Based on the basic strategy and tactics of warfare as described by Sun-tzu, Mao stresses the importance of guerrilla warfare tactics in a revolutionary war, emphasizing that they must be combined in conjunction with conventional warfare tactics.

Contents:

What Is Guerrilla Warfare?
The Relation Of Guerrilla Hostilitiesto Regular Operations
Guerrilla Warfare In History
Can Victory Be Attained By Guerrilla Operations?
Organization For Guerilla Warfare
The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare
The Strategy Of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan
Appendix

-- This communication is confidential to the parties it is intended to serve --
Fred Cohen - http://all.net/ - fc@all.net - fc@unhca.com - tel/fax: 925-454-0171
Fred Cohen & Associates - University of New Haven - Security Posture

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Received on Sat Dec 6 07:03:10 2003