[iwar] New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare

Chinese military analysts have meticulously studied the use of armed
force during the 1991 Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They
have noted with great interest the integration of military strikes and
psychological-warfare activities, and the increased strategic role that
the mass media played during both operations.1

To highlight the apparent shifting emphasis toward psychological warfare
for officers of the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, the prominent
Chinese military journal China Military Science has published six
articles on psychological warfare during the last two years:2 “On PSYWAR
in Recent High-Tech Local Wars,” by Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping; “The
Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China,” by Wu Juncang
and Zhang Qiancheng; “Focus on Psychological War Against the Background
of Grand Strategy,” and “Psychological Operations in the Context of
Grand Strategy,” both written by Xu Hezhen; “Comparison of Psychological
Warfare between China and the West,” by Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and
Yan Jianhong; and “On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare,” by Li
Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli. With the exception of Wu
Juncang, Zhang Qiancheng, Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong,
the authors of the six articles are identified as being instructors at
the Shijiazhuang Ground Forces Command Academy, which indicates that the
academy has an active and influential psychological-warfare department.
In fact, judging by their tone, some of the articles could have been
lifted directly from lectures presented during the academy’s
psychological-warfare courses.

The authors of the six articles suggest that at the strategic level,
China’s psychological- warfare operations will be characterized by
coercion, which will take the form of intimidation achieved through
demonstrations and shows of force. (Their suggestion supports a recent
Pentagon finding that viewed Chinese coercion as the greatest threat to
Taiwan.) At the tactical level, the articles suggest that the Chinese
are interested in offsetting their current deficiencies by procuring
advanced psychological-warfare equipment and by developing advanced
deployment techniques. The advanced equipment would include unmanned
aerial vehicles, or UAVs, fitted with loudspeakers and capable of
distributing “talking leaflets.” The articles also underscore the
differences in the cultural and subjective-cognition patterns of
Oriental and Western minds. Those differences lead the Chinese to apply
the principles of psychological warfare differently from the West. If
the U.S. is to see “eye to eye” with the Chinese and truly understand
their psychologicalwarfare methodology, it is vital that we comprehend
those differences. Finally, the 2 Special Warfare New Developments in
Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare by Timothy L. Thomas articles
provide recommendations about the PLA’s future psychological-warfare
requirements. From the discussion in all six articles, it is clear that
China is working hard to develop its psychological-warfare capabilities
for peacetime and wartime uses.

History of Chinese PSYOP

In “The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China,” Wu
Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng note that China’s history of psychological
operations goes back more than 4,000 years. The authors point out that
during the period 2100-256 B.C., psychological operations were part of
such historical events as the Zhuolu War (Zhuolu is a county in Hebei
Province), during which “victory could not be achieved with weapons”;
the Tang Oath, under which Chinese swore to do everything possible to
spread propaganda; and the Mu Oath, which prohibited the killing of
enemy soldiers who surrendered or who were taken as prisoners of war — a
psychological operation for that time period. Schemes for sowing
deception and creating false impressions and expectations represented
the acme of psychological operations during the period.3

According to Wu and Zhang, those early psychological experiences
culminated in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, which describes the main objective
of war as defeating the enemy without having to fight; the main essence
of war as attacking the enemy’s strategy; the main principle of war as
contending for control of hearts, minds and morale; and the main idea of
war as focusing on the enemy commander’s decisionmaking skills and
personal traits. Ancient Chinese psychological-operations doctrine also
focused on attacking the enemy’s strategy and diplomacy, on conducting
demonstrations and seeking dominance, on ignoring luck and dispelling
doubt; and on making threats and adhering to the Tao, the philosophy and
system of religion based on the teachings of Lao-tzu during the sixth
century B.C.4

Wu and Zhang indicate that Taoism, which coupled hardness with softness
in warfare, was not the only influence on the theory of psychological
operations in ancient China. Other influences were military studies;
Confucianism, which stressed the idea of “just wars”; and the study of
the I Ching (Book of Changes), which stressed the idea of yin and yang
(hardness and softness) being coupled to each other and thereby changing
each other. The I Ching formed an important theoretical foundation of
psychological-operations doctrine in ancient China5 that continues to
influence subjective cognition patterns in China today.

According to Wu and Zhang, the Qin (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-8
A.D. and 25-220 A.D.) periods of Chinese history witnessed other types
of psychological operations. The Qin period used the diplomatic
psychological-operations strategy of maintaining friendly relations with
distant enemies while attacking the enemy nearby. The Han dynasty
integrated the political, economic and military aspects of psychological
operations, raising it to a new level. The authors note the Three
Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.) and the Two Jins (263-420 A.D.) for the
diversity of their psychological- operations theory. Both dynasties
believed that attacking the enemy’s psychological state was more
effective than attacking his cities; therefore, they favored
psychological operations over combat operations with troops. The Ming
(1368-1662) and Qing (1662-1912) dynasties, on the other hand, allowed
Chinese psychologicaloperations doctrine to stagnate.6 Ancient Chinese
books discuss the psychological- operations experiences of their time.
For example, the Six Arts of War notes that in a command structure of 72
men, 19 (26 percent) were psychologicaloperations personnel responsible
for controlling morale: Five were to tout the army’s strength; four were
to tout the army’s fame in order to destroy the enemy’s confidence;
eight were to scout out the enemy’s mood and intent; and two were to
confuse the people by exploiting their belief in gods and spirits. The
book also instructs Chinese soldiers to protect their morale by ignoring
rumors, by disregarding luck and by avoiding any dealings with April
2003 3

omens or superstitions. The Six Arts also tells soldiers to sap enemy
morale, to string enemy nerves, and to strike terror in the enemy. Wu
and Zhang discuss two ancient tales that hint at the creativity of the
Chinese in accomplishing these tasks. In the first tale, Chinese
soldiers tied reed pipes to kites and flew the kites at night. The
kites made a wailing sound that, in the darkness, unnerved the enemy.
In the second tale, Chinese soldiers painted oxen in odd colors and tied
oil-soaked reeds to the tails of the oxen. The soldiers lit the reeds
and sent the enraged animals charging through the enemy camp at night,
causing terror among the enemy soldiers.7 Wu and Zhang note that the Six
Arts also refers to another key psychological aspect that should be
attacked — the mind of the enemy’s commanding general. While the Six
Arts discusses the psychological condition of the commander at the
strategic and tactical levels differently, it lists intelligence,
temperament and moral character as the three main characteristics
required of a Chinese commander.8 The book also lists 10 psychological
weaknesses of commanders that must be exploited. Those weaknesses
include being brave, treating death too lightly, being impatient and
thinking too quickly.

According to Wu and Zhang, the Marxist concept of the “dialectic” — the
process of change brought about by the conflict of opposing forces — had
a significant impact on the development of ancient Chinese
psychological-operations theory, although that fact was not “discovered”
until the advent of Marxism. The authors note that ancient doctrine
involved many categories of contradictions, out of which evolved many of
the principles and methods of psychological operations.9 Although
ancient, Sun Zi’s Art of War,Wu Zi’s Art of War, and Weiliao Zi and Sun
Bin’s Art of War provide incisive and comprehensive explanations of the
objectives, principles, methods and laws of psychological operations,
and their explanations are still valid. In summarizing their
understanding of ancient Chinese psychological operations, Wu and Zhang
maintain that those operations were designed to achieve strategic
deception, to map out a strategy, to secure victory through strategy,
and to integrate military strategy and psychological attack.10 The
authors find these objectives or activities of ancient Chinese
psychological- operations doctrine to be reflective of what the Chinese
observed during the Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo, further
emphasizing the importance of psychological operations in the modern
era.

Definitions

Each of the Chinese articles on psychological operations define the
concepts of psychological warfare or psychological operations in a
different way. Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng (who do not teach at the
Shijiazhuang Academy) define a psychological operation as the use of
various measures to influence a combat opponent’s ideology, attitude,
will or actions. The objective of a psychological operation is to win
without fighting or to win a big victory with only a little fighting.
Only by securing a favorable position in terms of politics and in terms
of the nature of warfare (by making one’s own side’s reasons for war to
appear to be moral and just) can one achieve a fundamental psychological
advantage.11

Xu Hezhen, a major general in the Chinese army and president of the
Shijiazhuang Academy, defines psychological warfare as a kind of
propaganda, and as persuasion that uses real force as its foundation.
According to Xu’s definition, a group can use political, economic,
scientific, military, diplomatic, ideological or cultural forces to
change an opponent’s national will or to influence and change an
opponent’s belief in, attitude toward, or hostility toward a populace,
toward organizations, or toward military and government agencies. Xu’s
two articles stress the need for using power and intimidation as key
psychological-warfare tools.12 Regarding the importance of psychological
warfare, Xu notes: “You may not be interested in psychological warfare,
but psychological warfare is interested in you.”13 According to Xu,
psychological warfare is also the exploration and study of the psy-

4 Special Warfare

Psychological quality of the thinking practiced by a nation’s strategic
leadership. To the Chinese, psychological quality includes the aspects
of psychological attainments and psychological character. Psychological
attainments primarily reflect the level at which a person grasps and
understands psychology. Psychological character is the individual human
aspect, primarily the psychological character that an individual has
already formed or is developing; e.g., an individual’s intellect,
temperament, disposition, emotions and will.14

Xu notes that Eastern psychological attainments are developed through
education in both dialectical materialism and historical materialism,
and through the influence and edifying effects of Eastern culture. His
theory applies particularly to strategic thought, in which “how to
think” is the key element and the most valuable quality.15 Xu agrees
that, in the end, the most important battles of modern psychological war
will be fought over values. The superpowers, he feels, are using armed
force to impose their value systems on other people. This was
demonstrated during operations in Kosovo, in Xu’s opinion, when
politicians used the idea that human rights are greater than sovereign
rights.16 After 50 years of Marxism, Xu notes,

“Decadent culture has unavoidably entered China. … Foreign culture has
constantly infiltrated China in the form of weapons and then at the
mental and conceptual level. In particular, the value system of Western
culture, with the idea of individualism at the center, a decadent
lifestyle based on materialism, and a concept of gain or benefit in
interpersonal relations, has produced a profound effect on certain
people’s values.”17 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, the
three other authors who are not identified as being faculty of the
Shijiazhuang Academy, define psychologicalwarfare theory as a field of
study that serves both as the point of intersection and as the boundary
line between psychology and the study of strategy and tactics. In their
opinion, psychological-warfare theory has a psychological foundation as
well as an ideological/theoretical foundation. The latter foundation is
determined by national characteristics, but the former foundation is
more constant. Psychological-warfare strategy is a psychological
embodiment of the orientation of a country’s national and military
strategies. 18 Li Yuankui, a senior colonel at the Shijiazhuang
Academy, and two master’sdegree candidates, Lieutenant Wang Yanzheng and
Lieutenant Yang Xiaoli, define psychological warfare as a multilevel
activity that is employed at the strategic, operational and tactical
levels. The authors perceive the targets of psychological warfare as
national will, the state of social awareness, cultural traditions, a
nation’s economic pulse, an opponent’s public sentiment, the tendencies
of popular will, military morale, and the opponent’s various social
groups, classes and strata. Because of the increased use of information
technology, the number of people who are subjected to psychological war
is greater than ever before.19 The increase in psychological-warfare
targets requires the development of a people’s war-defense mentality.

Li,Wang and Yang, like Xu, focus on values. They define a system of
values as a system of psychological tendencies that people use to
discriminate between good and bad. A system of values also provides the
basis by which a person recognizes the correct way of thinking and
acting. The highest strategic objective in psychological warfare, the
authors note, is achieved by changing a country’s fundamental social
concepts and its society’s sense of values. In this regard, the West
uses a system of values (democracy, freedom, human rights, etc.) in a
long-term attack on socialist countries. The West used the ideas of
democracy and human rights to undermine the communist party in the
Soviet Union, and it intends to use the same rationale for interfering
in China’s internal affairs. The U.S.’s strategy is to attack
political, moral, social and cultural values in target countries. 20
Chinese authors are fond of quoting former U.S. President Richard
Nixon’s phrase, “Attacking ideas is key to affecting history” as an
explanation of U.S. strategy. Senior Colonel Wang Zhenxing and

April 2003 5
Major Yang Suping of the Shijiazhuang
Academy did not define psychological warfare
or psychological operations in their
article.

Psychological security

A key aspect of conducting psychological warfare is to understand the
psychological characteristics of an opponent’s strategic leadership and
to conduct psychological attacks against them.21 Authors Wang Lianshui,
Ma Jingcheng, and Yan Jianhong discuss differences in Eastern and
Western minds in order to highlight East/West variances both in the
characteristics and in the laws of psychological warfare. The authors
note, “Differences in environment, cultural traditions, political
systems, economic strength, national-defense capability and national
spiritual belief lead to a great distinction in various nations in
subjective cognition, ideological basis, principles of applications and
structure of organization of psychological warfare.”22

According to the authors, even though China is a socialist country, the
Marxist theory of war provides the theoretical basis for Chinese
psychological warfare and gives Chinese psychological warfare its
advanced, moral, open and unified nature.23 Marxist theory regarding
proletarian strategy and tactics was one of Mao Zedong’s “magic weapons”
during the Chinese revolution. And even though psychological warfare is
characterized by active defense, China’s approach emphasizes
psychological attacks and the use of stratagems, particularly the use of
deception activities.24

Marxist theory opposes peaceful evolution, which the authors assert is
the basic Western tactic for subverting socialist countries. According
to Wang, Ma and Yan, peaceful evolution is the process that caused the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the Chinese must not allow
peaceful evolution to take place in China. The authors note that Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping developed a theory and a complete set of
tactics designed to counter the Western strategy.

In “On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare,” Li, Wang and Yang
emphasize that China must take the initiative in psychological- warfare
defense because psychological security is now an important aspect of
national security. Information and psychological factors are now
political and diplomatic weapons, and their power cannot be ignored.
Psychological warfare requires a low investment; it involves low risk;
and it is highly effective. The greater the amount of information that
is available to a population, the more room there will be for
psychological warfare. Any corner into which information can spread can
become a battlefield for psychological warfare. China must establish
the strategic idea of an active psychological-warfare defense. Active
defense should include tempering the minds of the Chinese people by
inoculation: allowing the people to come into contact with other ideas
and, through education and guidance, allowing them to see what is wrong
with those ideas. That approach will allow people to develop
psychological immunity. Opening their minds up to other ideas, however,
is not the same as cutting them loose.25

Li, Wang and Yang forecast that the main form of psychological warfare
will be contests for public opinion. To be able to seize public
opinion, China must develop its own independent information and media
power, guide public opinion, and conduct public-opinion propaganda. The
demand for information is a universal psychological need. Passive
psychological defense will not suffice. Only with initiative and
offense can China take the strategic initiative with regard to public
opinion. Propaganda must be prepared in advance, and it must include
material designed to counter the attacks that will be made against the
initial release of propaganda.26 In “On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local
Wars,”Wang and Yang emphasize the importance of attaining media
superiority and of controlling the negative effects of media coverage.
Media control will be one of the front lines in psychological wars.
News broadcasts and computer technology now allow people to watch a
battle in progress, as they would watch a sporting event. An event that
might have been

6 Special Warfare

known to only a few people in the past can now be witnessed by millions.
Such access to information affects public sentiment and morale.Wang and
Yang accuse the West of fulfilling its hegemonic wishes by manipulating
public opinion, by attaining media superiority, and by guiding people’s
psychological tendencies.27 Yet all three methods are exactly what the
Chinese are proud to claim elsewhere as their heritage. According to Xu
Hezhen in “Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand
Strategy,” intimidation is a key strategy that can be used to influence
both public opinion and the media. In fact, psychological war and
intimidation are so difficult to tell apart that they are almost twins.
Intimidation is both a strategy and a method. In modern times, the use
of nonviolent intimidation, which includes alliances, media
manipulation, economic sanctions, financial attack, information
isolation and network attacks, has increased. The U.S., Xu says, uses
its advantage of power as the foundation of psychological war, employing
arms displays, arms sales, and military exercises as intimidation.28 In
response, China must implement its own intimidation-psychological war
plan that includes Chinese threat forces and mechanisms, and
intimidation-psychological war strategy.29 China should develop an elite
and effective military intimidation force, fully apply all kinds of
nonmilitary intimidation methods, establish a psychological intimidation
mechanism that will have strategic maneuvering as its core, and organize
and apply all kinds of psychological intimidation factors, thus
developing the greatest psychological intimidation effect. Intimidation
must be established on the foundation of power; without power,
intimidation is only a scarecrow.30

Strategy

In “The Doctrine of Psychological Operations in Ancient China,” Wu
Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng argue that strategy is fundamental, and that
mapping out a strategy is the most traditional Chinese characteristic of
psychological warfare. Mapping out the strategy is followed by
attacking an opponent’s alliances, attacking his army, and attacking his
cities — in that order. The best strategy is to attack the enemy’s
mind, leaving him unable to plan. Strategy can create psychological
misperceptions that will cause one side to remain unprepared. The
prepared side can then win without fighting. In a more narrow sense,
the use of strategy may be seen in demonstrations and feints that
surprise the enemy by hitting him where he is unprepared.31

Authors Wang, Ma and Yan see major differences between China and the
West regarding the strategic starting points and the orientation of
psychological warfare. By strategic starting points, the authors mean
psychological warfare’s nature, objectives and factors for victory.
China, the authors say, looks at psychological warfare as a method of
spreading truth and justice; of trying to win people’s minds; and of
exposing an enemy’s plot to confuse, corrupt or penetrate China’s mental
space. The West, the authors contend, views psychological warfare as a
way of promoting its hegemonic strategy that is designed to create
turmoil and division within other countries. (Clearly, more than a few
Western analysts would disagree with that categorization.) Regarding the
orientation of psychological- warfare strategy,Wang, Ma and Yan list two
strategic orientations: offensive and defensive. The orientations
differ in their roles, in their employment, and in the structure of
their deployment. China must continue to combine offense with defense,
and to use offense for defense (so that the country can shift from
passive to active modes and expand its room for maneuver).

32 From Wu and Zhang’s perspective, demonstrations and shows of force
are the basic strategic methods of conducting psychological operations.
Demonstrations were used in ancient times, as detailed in the “Thirty
Six Stratagems of War,” a collection of Chinese proverbs and
instructions for winning at war. A demonstration is an attack that
exploits strengths and weaknesses, and its objective is to take the
enemy by surprise. One may exploit strengths and weaknesses by
appearing to be strong when one is weak, or by appear- April 2003 7 ing
to be weak when one is strong.33

In short, demonstrations are a way of getting friendly and enemy forces
to interact psychologically. Demonstrations are also a form of
deterrence, which is another psychological- warfare concept.
Demonstrations establish credibility and fear, two of the three elements
of deterrence theory (reliability is the third). Strategy’s essence,
according to Xu, is thinking, and the quality of one’s thinking
determines the quality of one’s strategy. Strategic thinking is a
big-picture, integrated method of thought, a bird’s-eye-view way of
thinking. It is anticipatory, realistic and response oriented, and it
is a kind of rational thinking.34

Information technology and forces

Information technology has made it possible for psychological warfare to
become both a strategic resource and a method, and psychological
specialists are exploiting many information-age technologies. For
example, future military attacks will be combined with attacks on
electronic technology; virtual reality will plant false information in
an enemy’s command-information system, creating misperceptions among
commanders; and network intruders may be able to penetrate terminals on
the network, executing an all-directional psychological attack.35

According to Wang and Yang, “In modern times the vast development in
information science, psychology, the science of broadcasting, and other
sciences, and in particular the emergence of new and high technologies
such as satellite communications, electronic computers, networking
technology, and multimedia technology, provide a firm theoretical
foundation and modern tools for psychological warfare.”36

Li, Wang and Yang see networks as the most important aspect of the
technological battle. Network psychological warfare is a new topic in
psychological-warfare defense, but networks will become the main
psychological- warfare battlefield in the future. Global networks
provide more space in which to engage in propaganda. Network data can
be put online in secrecy by almost anyone; it is difficult to verify who
the providers of network data are; and access to information is not
subject to restrictions of time or place. Network attacks can throw a
country’s social, political and economic life into chaos, producing a
shock effect on people’s minds and leading to political instability. In
order to develop network defense, China must develop network
sovereignty, establish laws for network activities, and establish
information-protection forces. Creating competent forces for
information war and psychological warfare will help ensure China’s
information security and psychological security.37

Writing about the impact of information technology, Wang and Yang list
several futuristic ideas for psychological-warfare equipment, but they
do not specify whether the ideas are theirs or those of another country.
They note that an “intelligent” component has been added to
psychological- warfare equipment. The intelligent component includes
computers used to guide the operating and sensing systems of UAVs. UAVs
can recognize targets, broadcast propaganda and scatter leaflets before
returning to their base. In the future, leaflets will combine visual,
audio and speech elements, much like the talking birthday cards
currently marketed by some U.S. card manufacturers. In a direct
reference to U.S. technology, the authors note that Livermore
Laboratories has developed a method of projecting holographic images
high into the clouds.

According to Wang and Yang, the projections produce a type of illusory
psychological warfare by portraying Islamic martyrs who appear to speak
to soldiers from the clouds.38

In contemporary wars, such as the Gulf War, the first targets attacked
have been targets with psychological value, such as television,
broadcasting and other communications venues. Destruction of those
targets helped cause psychological passivity, panic and, eventually,
defeat. Russia underestimated the power of communications during its
first war with Chechnya from 1994-96. The Chechens were able to exert a
major psychological influence on the course and the outcome of the war
by

8 Special Warfare

utilizing the impact of instantaneous field reporting to TV stations.
That reporting greatly affected public opinion.39 TV also played a major
role in the Gulf War, demonstrating the lethality of coalition weaponry
to the Iraqi leadership. On the other hand, TV reports on Iraqi Scuds
also played a significant psychological role by invoking terror and
panic among the residents of Israel and Saudi Arabia.40

Threats

General Xu Hezhen’s article, “Psychological Operations in the Context of
Grand Strategy,” describes the threats facing China, which he labeled as
“hard warfare” (high-tech warfare) and “soft warfare” (psychological
warfare designed to “westernize” or “split” China). Xu notes that while
the former is the most difficult, the latter could be accomplished in
the context of a grand strategy in which psychological warfare plays an
increasingly important role in safeguarding national security and in
winning high-tech wars.41

Because psychological war can achieve the greatest number of political
benefits and the greatest psychological influence while taking almost no
risks, Xu believes that the U.S. is using a psychological-warfare
strategy — peaceful evolution — to enhance the disintegration of
socialist countries. He says that as part of that strategy, the U.S.
has developed a military force that possesses advanced weapons, and that
the U.S. has carried out violent psychological threats toward socialist
nations. According to Xu, the U.S. has used economics and trade to
infiltrate socialist nations and has used personnel exchanges to carry
out ideological and cultural psychological infiltration, thereby
fostering an anti-socialist force.

According to Xu, U.S. psychological warfare undermined the Soviet
Union, and he sees evidence of a similar threat to China during the last
two U.S. presidential administrations. While the Clinton era focused
on engaging China, Xu says, the Bush administration has a clear
strategic goal of containing China.42 Finally, in Xu’s opinion, the U.S.
is using religion to weaken the ideology of Marxism.43

Of course, the greatest psychologicalwarfare threat is the threat of
taking control of morale, the foundation stone for victory, according to
Wu and Zhang. They describe five tactics for controlling morale:

• With a mighty opponent, wait him out;
• With an arrogant opponent, show him respect for a long time;
• With a firm opponent, entice and then seize him;
• With an evasive opponent, get close to him in front, make noise on his flanks,
        dig deep ditches and put up high ramparts, and make it hard for him to get
        provisions;
• With a placid opponent, make noise to frighten him, jolt him by breaking
through, and if he comes at you, then attack him, otherwise, fall back.44

Conclusions

The foregoing discussion indicates that the theory of psychological
warfare has tremendous significance and value to China. Chinese
theorists are attempting to develop an updated ideology and strategy of
psychological warfare — one that will focus on intimidation and on
exploiting the differences between Eastern and Western mentalities.
That implies that China will be establishing a command structure for
psychological warfare, as well as creating special units that will
attempt to overcome Chinese inferiority in high-tech weapons.45 More
important, Chinese theorists appear to believe that because modern
psychological warfare can help ensure stability and shape
national-security thinking, it is more applicable in peace than in
war.46 In offering a recommendation for future psychological-warfare
forces in China, Major General Xu asks Chinese leaders to:

• Develop a psychological-warfare system that integrates specialized and
non-specialized personnel, and that emphasizes China’s special
characteristics.

• Establish a psychological-warfare coordination agency at the national
level to provide guidance and coordination for national
psychological-warfare actions.

• Establish a psychological-warfare command agency, under the unified
leadership of the Central Military Commission and the party committee.
April 2003 9

• Establish psychological-warfare scientific research agencies of all
kinds to guide the work nationally and in the military.

• Establish a specialized psychologicalwarfare corps that would form a
consolidated and effective psychological attack force.

• Develop a modernized basis for psychological- warfare material and
technical equipment.

• Form a people’s psychological-warfare mentality by developing
psychologicalwarfare education for the masses and for all commanders in
the military.47

According to Wang and Yang, China has many psychological-warfare
shortcomings to overcome. Those include the backwardness and
nonspecialization of current Chinese psychological-operations forces, a
lack of talent, and the difficulty of forming a unified and coordinated
psychological-warfare command.Wang and Yang also believe that China
lacks a unified understanding of the strategic role of psychological
warfare and of the role that psychological warfare can play in high-tech
local wars.48 Wang, Ma and Yan believe that in order for China to
overcome its weakness in equipment, materials and technical content, it
must develop a force that combines its mass-action strength with a
specialized structure for psychological warfare.49 Overall, all these
shortcomings hurt the development of a coordinated psychological war
strategy for the PLA.

Apparently, other nations have noticed China’s focus on psychological
warfare and have responded. In January 2002, Taiwan, taking advice from
U.S. military officials, activated its first modern
psychologicalwarfare unit to counter China’s buildup.50 The existing
Taiwanese psychological-operations unit, which is part of the
politicalwarfare department, does not focus on such subjects as
information warfare. Finally, China will continue to view the U.S. as
its major psychological-warfare threat. Xu says that the U.S.
objective is to gain benefits from the Chinese consumer market and to
maintain long-term political and psychological pressure on China. The
U.S. will accomplish that objective by attacking China’s national
self-respect and by compelling China to do what the U.S. asks.51 Xu
warns the Chinese that psychological acceptance of socialism depends on
China’s comprehensive national strength and on the level of progress
that the social system achieves in economic development and in socialist
awakening. He says that one cannot believe that “the foreign moon is
rounder than our own,” for this is defeatist psychology. Conviction in
the correctness of one’s own system is what works, and that is what is
required.52 In the end, we should not expect China to waver from the
main characteristics of its psychological-warfare doctrine: strong
reliance on the use of war experience; deep cultural roots; the
influence of Marxist materialist dialectics; and the role of strategic
deception.53

 China will use power projection as a means of achieving success in
influencing the activities of foreign nations. Its centralized
leadership system will continue to exert control over the news,
propaganda and public opinion.54 Most important for Western analysts is
the fact that Chinese theorists “think” strategically in a way that few
foreigners do. Western analysts will have to come to terms with this
fact if they are to learn to predict Chinese psychological-warfare
strategy in the coming years. Timothy L. Thomas is an analyst for the
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. A retired Army
lieutenant colonel, Thomas served in the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP
Group, from 1979 to 1982. From 1987 to 1990, he served as director of
Soviet studies at the former U.S. Army Russian Institute at Garmisch,
Germany.

Notes:

1 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping, “On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local
Wars,” Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 20 December 2000, pp.
127-33, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site on 8 March
2001. No specific pages will be listed for quotes from all the articles
used in the preparation of this article, since the author cannot read
Chinese and 10 Special Warfare does not know on which pages of the
article the translations (from FBIS) appeared.

2 These articles form the basis for this discussion. The journal China
Military Science is the rough equivalent of the U.S. armed forces’
Joint Force Quarterly. One of the Chinese articles noted that the
terms“psychological warfare” and “psychological operations” are
interchangeable (which, of course, Western analysts would refute). This
author uses the term “psychological warfare” because FBIS translators
used the term more often than they used “psychological operations.” One
exception is the article by Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng, for which
translators used the term “psychological operations” exclusively.

3 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng, “The Doctrine of Psychological
Operations in Ancient China,” Junshi Kexue (China Military Science),
Issue 5 2002, pp. 88- 94, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS
Web site 14 January 2002.

4 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
5 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
6 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
7 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
8 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
9 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
10 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
11 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.

12 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of
Grand Strategy,” Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Issue 5 2000,
pp. 67-76, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 11
December 2000.

13 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand
Strategy,” Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 30 September 2001, pp.
94-100, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 21 November
2001.

14 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand
Strategy.”

15 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand
Strategy.”

16 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
17 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”

18 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong, “Comparison of
Psychological Warfare Between China and the West,” Junshi Kexue (China
Military Science), Issue 6 2000, pp. 102-10, as translated and
downloaded from the FBIS Web site 25 June 2001.

19 Li Yuankui, Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli, “On Defense in Modern
Psychological Warfare,” Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Issue 6
2000, pp. 117- 26, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site
8 March 2001.

20 Li Yuankui,Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.
21 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy.”
22 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.
23 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.
24 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.
25 Li Yuankui,Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.
26 Li Yuankui,Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.
27 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.
28 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
29 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
30 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
31 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
32 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.
33 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
34 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy.”
35 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.
36 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.
37 Li Yuankui,Wang Yanzheng and Yang Xiaoli.
38 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.
39 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.
40 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.
41 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy.”
42 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy.”
43 Xu Hezhen, “Psychological Operations in the Context of Grand Strategy.”
44 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
45 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
46 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
47 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
48 Wang Zhenxing and Yang Suping.
49 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong.
50 Brian Hsu, Taipei Times (Internet Version-WWW),
7 December 2001, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site 7 December 2001.
51 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
52 Xu Hezhen, “Focus on Psychological War.”
53 Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiancheng.
54 Wang Lianshui, Ma Jingcheng and Yan Jianhong. April 2003 11

-- This communication is confidential to the parties it is intended to serve --
Fred Cohen - http://all.net/ - fc@all.net - fc@unhca.com - tel/fax: 925-454-0171
Fred Cohen & Associates - University of New Haven - Security Posture

------------------
http://all.net/

Yahoo! Groups Links

To visit your group on the web, go to:
 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/iwar/

To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
 iwar-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
 http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
Received on Sun Dec 28 07:21:14 2003