[iwar] Chinese Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine

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Chinese Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine

Related Pages:
One Point, Two Faces - The Overwhelming Attack
The Tiger and the Elephant - Viet Minh strategy and tactics overview

Although it concerns Chinese tactics, techniques and doctrine used in the
Korean War, this US Army study is included because it provides a very
accurate picture of the tactics and techniques employed by Viet Minh
regulars in mobile warfara. This is hardly surprising since all major Viet
Minh regular units underwent extensive training in China and were
accompanied in the field by officers of the Chinese Military Advisory Group
whose most prominent members are shown in the group photo above..
Furthermore, whathever formal training was received by most Viet Minh
officers in Vietnam was closely modelled on Chinese practices. As a result,
one simply needs to substitute "VM" for "CCF" and "CEFEO" for "UN" while
reading this page.

Section A - The Attack
I b
-- arge
number of prisoners of war have been interrogated, captured enemy documents
and after-action reports have been studied, and a study has been made of UN
after-action reports.
A more prolonged and intensive study will be required to fill in completely
all the details. However, it is believed that in view of the consistency of
the information upon which this analysis is based, it represents a fairly
accurate picture of the pattern of attack employed by the CCF.

II bThis tive attacks. The unit
coming into contact with the enemy stiffens its efforts, while other
elements attack the enemy flanks. The CCF also favors two-pronged assault
and envelopment tactics, not only for the larger units, but for some of the
smaller units.
During the approach-march the CCF normally employs a "two up, one back"
formation. Whenever possible, the following maneuver is executed (a CCF Army
is used here for illustration; however, the tactics apply equally well for
lower units). During the approach-march two divisions move forward with the
third in reserve. When the main line of enemy resistance, or formidable
enemy resistance is encountered, one division spreads out to assume the
responsibility for both division sectors (i.e., the entire Army front),
while the second division withdraws to the area of the reserve division. The
division left on the line acts as a screening force, and immediately
dispatches probing elements to confuse the enemy and to seek weak points in
the enemy defenses. Often, small units will be dispatched to engage
numerically superior enemy units, in order to confuse the enemy.

Meanwhile the division which was relieved is reorganized in the rear area.
The period of preparation usually takes about three days from the time the
division leaves the line until the army is ready to attack. During this
period the acquisition of intelligence is most important (it has been fairly
well established that the CCF will not attack without the numerical
superiority ratio of at least six to one). Reconnaissance units arc
dispatched to ascertain the enemy strength and defense positions. Civilians
from the immediate neighborhood are interrogated concerning enemy strength
and dispositions. PWs have claimed that this latter method of obtaining
information has proved most fruitful and reliable, and that information
resulting from CCF probing attacks is given less weight than that gained
through the interrogation of civilians and the patrolling by the
reconnaissance elements.

At the end of this reorganization and information-stoking period one of the
two divisions in the roar is committed to a thrust on a maximum frontage of
three miles, through a weak point in the enemy lines. The point selected
will preferably be at the boundary separating two large enemy units
(regiments or divisions) or a section of the line hold by ROK units. When
this attacking division has penetrated the enemy line to a sufficient depth
to enable the division to engage the enemy reserve units, five battalions
engage the reserves, while two battalions attempt an encirclement of the
enemy units on line.

Meanwhile, elements of the reserve CCF division execute an envelopment of
the other enemy flank in an attempt to join forces with the two encircling
battalions from the penetrating division.

During the entire engagement the CCF division on the line actively continues
to occupy the enemy. When the CCF meets with initial success at any point in
the maneuver, it exploits this success without regard for the presence of UN
units on its flanks.

After the ground has boen secured the army reestablishes its "two up, one
back" formation.

In the attack the Army front will not be less than 20 kilometers. The
minimum division front is 10 kilometers. The reserve division is located
approximately three hours marching distance from the front.

The reserve army is generally located 40 kilometers to the rear of the
attacking armies. It is so located as to be out of normal artillery range,
yet close enough to the front to be available to any area upon demand.

III bcommunication eriod of regroupment and reorganization prior to an attack the
CCF division occupies an assembly area which is normally 25 kilometers from
enemy front lines. The exact distance depends upon three factors: (1) the
range of enemy artillery, (2) the distance the enemy patrols to his front
and, (3) the availability of proper terrain in which to conceal troops. A
screening force is positioned in front of the assembly area, where it
remains for the attack until all units are prepared. Supplies are issued,
and each individual soldier receives his rations end ammunition, to be used
only on order. According to PW statements, supply trucks actually enter
these assembly areas to make distribution.
The night before the attack, the regiments move forward from the division
assembly area to regimental areas approximately ten kilometers from the
enemy frontlines. There they dig in and occupy defensive positions. While in
these positions the battalion commanders are issued their orders and their
zones of attack are assigned.

The following evening at dusk the battalions move out to attack. Usually all
units halt within one to two thousand meters of the enemy lines where they
take a short rest period, during which they may eat one of their combat
rations. It is at this point that the company commanders are issued their
orders and take over from the battalion commanders. There appears to be no
flexibility permitted commanders of battalion or lower size units with
respect to the method of attack or the timing thereof.

B. Sequence of events during the attack (See Sketch No.6)
This sequence of events can best be understood by illustration. Enclosure #l
is a graphic representation of a battalion in an attack.
Following the receipt of its mission, in the regimental assembly area, to
attack Hill "E" and destroy an estimated three hundred enemy, the battalion,
composed of three infantry companies of three platoons each, plus an
attached bazooka platoon, move out of the assembly area in a column of
companies and marched toward Hill "B" to assembly point "A". At the latter
point the companies were deployed within an area three hundred meters in
width and approximately four hundred meters in depth. The battalion was
ordered to dig in immediately with the main assault company dispersed along
the reverse slope of Hill "B" and the remaining companies one hundred meters
to the rear and toward the flanks. The Battalion Command Post was
established three hundred meters further to the rear. An observer-sentry was
posted at each end of Hill "B" and additional observation was obtained from
posts along the ridge.

The battalion remained positioned in this area until approximately 2000
hours, or shortly after dark, on the night of the attack. At this time
Company "1" moved down the forward slope of Hill "B" toward Line "C", some
five hundred meters distant, in three parallel platoon columns. At the same
time, Companies "2" and "3" were slightly to the rear of the lead company
and the Battalion CP was moved to top of Hill "E".

Upon reaching Line "C" each platoon of the lead company formed into a column
of three-man assault teams and proceeded to move forward approximately three
hundred meters to Line "D".

During this phase of the advance, the two flank companies remained abreast
of Company "1". The Battalion CP was moved from the crest of Hill "B" to the
base of the forward slope. The bazooka platoon remained roughly in the
center of the sector in the vicinity. When all attacking elements had
reached Line "D", which might well be compared to our line of departure,
they remained in position until some time between 2300 and 2400 hours.

At a given signal one twelve-man squad deployed as skirmishers and, carrying
sub-machine guns (in this instance Thompsons with 5 clips of ammunition) and
four hand grenades, moved forward about 200 meters to the base of Hill "E"
and commenced firing on enemy positions. This was the signal for the
remainder of the company, which had formed into nine columns of three-man
assault teams, to begin and move up the face of Hill "E". Concurrently, the
two flanking companies moved forward from Line of Departure as skirmishers
in a double envelopment of the hill.

The mission of Company "1" was to gain the crest of the hill and establish
firm positions while Companies "2" and "3" completed their maneuver and
joined forces. In this particular action the major portion of the ROK forces
managed to withdraw from the area prior to the link-up of the encircling
companies.

IV - Discussion
a. Time element: CCF night attacks might almost be said to have become
standardized as regards tine. For the most part attacks appear to be
launched between 2300 and 0100 hours. As a result of interrogation it was
learned that attacking units departed from their final assembly areas
shortly after dark and remained on, or in close proximity to, the Line of
Departure until the assault was launched. Time of arrival of the attacking
elements at the final assembly point appears to be discretionary with the
commanding officer and dependent in large part on the tactical situation. In
the particular case cited, the battalion arrived in Area "A" around 100
hours on the day of the attack. PWs have stated that their units arrived at
final assembly areas any tine from one or two hours before moving forward,
to the night preceding the attack.
b. Distances: It became quickly apparent in the early stages of the study
that distances from enemy positions to the final assembly area fell into a
fairly stable pattern. In nearly all instances the Line of Departure was
located two hundred meters from enemy positions; A "control line" was
located 500 to 700 meters to the rear of the Line of Departure and
occasionally a second "control line" was located 500 meters further to the
rear, Or just forward of the assembly point. The location of enemy assembly
areas further to the enemy's rear is considered to be of a more flexible
nature.

C. Control: In the above attack it was learned that each of the three
companies and battalion headquarters possessed one US Walkie-Talkie radio.
The PWs stated that his regiment had a total of seven of these captured
radios; that one remained with each battalion; that companies received them
only when they were being committed. After each engagement the radios were
returned to regiment. Interrogation tended to reveal a very limited use of
these Walkie-Talkie radios. It is felt that control of the attacking forces
was maintained primarily through the extensive employment of assembly areas
and "lines"; that movement by column was an additional measure of control.

V - Conclusions
a. With very few exceptions, all intermediate moves made by the enemy prior
to attack are performed during the hours of darkness.
b. The enemy shows a definite propensity for night attacks and the time that
his forward units will engage UN forces will depend upon the tine required
for the approach march from his final assembly area.

c. There appears to be, insofar as can be ascertained, a flexibility
permitted CCF commanders in occupying intermediate assembly areas. However,
there is no flexibility permitted with respect to the tine of jump-off.

d. No deviation is permitted company commanders with regard to their method
of attack.

e. Attacks against the flanks of friendly positions are almost certain to
follow shortly behind an initial frontal assault of positions.

f. The enemy attack will not always be immediately preceded by enemy probing
CE patrolling.

VI b for launching their
attacks and therefore vary from Western doctrine which favors the day time
attack. While CCF and NK differ in their choice of the best time of the
night to launch an attack, coordinated attacks by both forces follow CCF
doctrine.
The statement is credited to Lieutenant General Ma Chang, CO, 4th CCF Army
(Corps), that "daylight warfare has become disastrous for the CCF because of
a lack of air power, consequently night envelopment must be employed". The
actual tactics employed by the CCF in night attacks do not differ
substantially from those used in other CCF assaults. The pattern of "two up,
one back" and envelopment after initial engagement is not changed.

According to General Ma, the following sequence would apply to night
attacks:

(1) Pass IP at 1900 hours or at first dark, and advance to approximately 2
kilometers from UN lines.
(2) Initiate attack at 2100 hours.

(3) At 2200 hours secure ground that was taken during assault, and rest.

(4) Begin one-hour assault between 0300 - 0400 hours. After assault withdraw
to positions gained during initial attack.

B. CCF Tactics
An analysis of CCF major attacks against UN forces reveals that, with the
exception of one attack, each attack commenced on a night when moonlight
could be expected to provide maximum illumination. In each case the attack
was launched when the noon was in the phase between Full Moon and Last
Quarter, and when moonset did not occur until after sunrise the text
morning.

The first attack against USAK troops was launched on night of 31
October, two days after Full Moon. The third attack was on the night 31
December - 1 January, seven days after Full Moon. The CCF launched their
attack on US X Corps in the Chosin Reservoir area on the night of 27 - 28
November, four days after Full Noon. The enemy may well have considered that
the visibility afforded his troops by moon illumination out-weighed the
disadvantage suffered as a result of UN Air action during this period of
favorable air operating conditions. The details of the CCF night attack have
been incorporated in the foregoing paragraphs.

C. North Korean tactics for small unit night attacks
Statements by North Korean Prisoners of War have consistently disclosed the
following tactics to be employed in night attacks:
(1) Soldiers to participate in the night attack are selected by the officers
assigned the mission of launching the attack. Particular emphasis is placed
on strength, health and character in the selection of the men.

(2) During the day the soldiers are told of the attack scheduled for that
night and are given an opportunity to rest and sleep. Two hours prior to
departure time the men arc awakened.

(3) The men are oriented on the route and method of approach to enemy
positions, and the special. pass-word and signal to be used during the
attack. After thorough study of the area, the assembly point for use after
the attack is selected.

(4) The approach to the attack area is through defiles, valleys, and along
little-used trails with the troops in a single file formation - 10 yards
between men. When a point is reached some 100 - 200 yards from UN positions,
the attacking force deploys. After each man is positioned, the attackers
crawl to 50 yards of enemy lines. The first shot, fired by the leader, is
the signal for all men to charge and open fire on the UN forces. Each man is
quipped with the PPSh sub-machine gun. Heavy and light machine guns are
deployed to assist a withdrawal in the event the attack fails.

(5) The attack will usually take place at approximately 0400 hours and
seldom on moonlit nights.

(6) Reports have been received that North Korean troops carry wooden
clappers for deception purposes to simulate fire and at the same time
conserve ammunition.

(7) Local civilians are employed to spy on the enemy and obtain information
concerning the terrain over which the attack will take place.

Source:
Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine, US Army Military History Research
Collection n. 183, September 1951, Chapter II Tactics, pp. 16-21.

Haven - Security Posture

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Received on Sun Dec 28 07:10:13 2003