[iwar] Historical posting
From: Fred Cohen
From: fc@all.net
To: iwar@onelist.com
Mon, Jan 1, 1999
fc Mon Jan 1, 1999
Received: (from fc@localhost) by all.net (8.9.3/8.7.3) id FAA15269 for iwar@onelist.com; Tue, 18 Apr 2000 05:21:43 -0700
To: iwar@onelist.com
MIME-Version: 1.0
Mailing-List: list iwar@egroups.com; contact iwar-owner@egroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list iwar@egroups.com
Precedence: bulk
List-Unsubscribe:
Date: Mon, Jan 1, 1999
From: Fred Cohen
Reply-To: iwar@egroups.com
Subject: [iwar] Historical posting
At 10:17 AM 10/17/99 -0400, you wrote:
>From: Ross Stapleton-Gray amicus@w...
[snip]
>No, I never said there were lots of terrorist attempts. Terrorists are
>lonely, and relatively few.
>
>Ross
Yes, I tend to agree with your assessment of the current cyberterror issue.
The hype serves mostly to benefit those with repressive agendas.
However, I feel that there are real issues on the (perhaps distant) horizon,
and am a bit dissapointed that there are not more exchanges like this thread
where these issues are examined.
Does anyone think we are "really connected" today? I'll wager that in 10 to
20 years, 1999 will look like the dark ages of connectivity. The potential
for widespread cascading failures of the intentional kind may multiply in
proportion.
Unlike conventional warfare, where 2 billion bucks buys you roughly 200 percent
the (throw-weight, sensitive materials, enabling technology) as a mere 1 billion
would buy, in cyberwarfare it buys you maybe a 5% increase. Like a biological
agent that can multiply exponentially, software pathogens can expand from
a tiny point to engulf entire networks. A difference; one need not have an
advanced degree in genetics to engineer such pathogens. They may be developed
and tested on the cheap. I believe a dedicated cell of precocious high school
students could wreak havok commensurate to the entire cyberwarfare arm of a
small government if they did a bit of the right research in advance.
So it dismays me to think that major governments may be more interested in
developing cyberwarfare assault tools in the name of national security,
rather than focus upon more "verifiable stability" in systems on the defensive
side. Cryptographic restrictions, for example, promulgated to thwart
"terrorists and drug dealers" serves mainly to make the honest systems
less stable.
Comments?
Tony Bartoletti LL
IOWA Center LL LL
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LL LL LL
PO Box 808, L - 089 LL LL LL
Livermore, CA 94551-9900 LL LL LLLLLLLL
phone: 925-422-3881 fax: 925-423-8081 LL LLLLLLLL
email: azb@l... LLLLLLLL