[iwar] Historical posting
From: Fred Cohen
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Mon, Jan 1, 1999
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Date: Mon, Jan 1, 1999
From: Fred Cohen
Reply-To: iwar@egroups.com
Subject: [iwar] Historical posting
I think current government thinking is along the lines of defensive nature,
but the post side of a defensive nature is developing an offensive nature.
How can you learn what you would need defensivly without learning the flip
side.
The US government has long been under attack by well known individuals who
have decided to wage their version of cyber-warfare on it's own soil. What
they fail to realize is the individuals if push came to shove would make
excellant enemies of foreign states if the idea came to them.
There are lots of threads on the defensive issue, unversities are the
greatest ones for these, they are the ones currently researching into the
defensive measure. You can't find an IDS system out there without realizing
that it was partialially or totally developed by students.
So where are we going on the horizon, were fortunate North America is
leading the charge in defensive posture, but at the same time in offensive
posture. A combination of the two is what will be on the horizon.
Glenn R Williamson
Glenn_Williamson@o...
-----Original Message-----
From: Tony Bartoletti azb@l...
To: iwar@onelist.com iwar@onelist.com
Date: Monday, October 18, 1999 3:20 PM
Subject: Re: [iwar] Here's a worthwhile one...
>From: Tony Bartoletti azb@l...
>
>At 10:17 AM 10/17/99 -0400, you wrote:
>>From: Ross Stapleton-Gray amicus@w...
>
>[snip]
>
>>No, I never said there were lots of terrorist attempts. Terrorists are
>>lonely, and relatively few.
>>
>>Ross
>
>Yes, I tend to agree with your assessment of the current cyberterror issue.
>The hype serves mostly to benefit those with repressive agendas.
>
>However, I feel that there are real issues on the (perhaps distant)
horizon,
>and am a bit dissapointed that there are not more exchanges like this
thread
>where these issues are examined.
>
>Does anyone think we are "really connected" today? I'll wager that in 10
to
>20 years, 1999 will look like the dark ages of connectivity. The potential
>for widespread cascading failures of the intentional kind may multiply in
>proportion.
>
>Unlike conventional warfare, where 2 billion bucks buys you roughly 200
percent
>the (throw-weight, sensitive materials, enabling technology) as a mere 1
billion
>would buy, in cyberwarfare it buys you maybe a 5% increase. Like a
biological
>agent that can multiply exponentially, software pathogens can expand from
>a tiny point to engulf entire networks. A difference; one need not have an
>advanced degree in genetics to engineer such pathogens. They may be
developed
>and tested on the cheap. I believe a dedicated cell of precocious high
school
>students could wreak havok commensurate to the entire cyberwarfare arm of a
>small government if they did a bit of the right research in advance.
>
>So it dismays me to think that major governments may be more interested in
>developing cyberwarfare assault tools in the name of national security,
>rather than focus upon more "verifiable stability" in systems on the
defensive
>side. Cryptographic restrictions, for example, promulgated to thwart
>"terrorists and drug dealers" serves mainly to make the honest systems
>less stable.
>
>Comments?
>
>
>
>
>Tony Bartoletti LL
>IOWA Center LL LL
>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LL LL LL
>PO Box 808, L - 089 LL LL LL
>Livermore, CA 94551-9900 LL LL LLLLLLLL
>phone: 925-422-3881 fax: 925-423-8081 LL LLLLLLLL
>email: azb@l... LLLLLLLL
>
>>------------------
>http://all.net/